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Abstract 
Characterizing the Microeconomic Decision Factors of Energy Efficient Commercial 
Building Retrofits 
Michael A. Hamilton 
Patrick L. Gurian, Ph.D. 
 
 
Engineering analyses have claimed that the implementation of retrofits in existing 
buildings can significantly reduce their energy consumption and generate cost savings 
for owners – yet such investment in energy efficiency has been minimal by many 
standards.  The primary goal of this thesis is to identify and quantify the factors 
affecting stakeholders’ decisions to adopt (or not adopt) energy conservation measures 
during commercial building retrofits, and then to suggest ways in which these decision 
processes can be improved through policy instruments.   Chapter I presents a literature 
review of previous research on the subject and explains the theoretical basis of the 
“energy-efficiency gap.”  Chapter II presents findings from a set of surveys in order to 
clarify the major determinants of the commercial energy-efficient building retrofit 
decision – and uses these data to make observations of differences in retrofit investment 
preferences between different types of organizations and leasing structures.  Chapter III 
summarizes the implications of the first two chapters and suggests possible policy-based 
solutions to encourage increased attention to energy efficiency in the commercial 
building sector.  Results from the surveys conducted for this study are shown to be 
generally in agreement with a third data source, the Johnson Controls Energy Efficiency 
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2011 Indicator survey.  The relative importance of various financial metrics (such as 
simple payback period) in stakeholders’ decision processes is quantified and the ability 
to alter the outcomes of these processes via the addition of new financial information is 
documented.  It is found that stakeholders’ behavior may be partially explained by their 
beliefs in the future cost of energy, which they expect will decrease in real terms over the 
next 20 years (though significant variation does exist in these perceptions).  An 
approximate quantitative measure of “split incentives” is obtained and differences in its 
effect between different organization ownership structures are outlined.  Together, the 
data presented in this thesis suggest that an “energy efficiency gap” does exist, though 
to a smaller degree than have been suggested by some.  Specific policy solutions to 
increase investment in energy efficiency are recommended, including 1) targeting non-
profit and government organizations to act as “early adopters,” 2) the creation of a third-
party database with cost and performance information for ECMs, and 3) the widespread 
adoption of on-bill financing. 
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CHAPTER I : LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
1.  BACKGROUND 
The “energy efficiency gap” is a highly-politicized term originating in 
engineering analyses indicating that there may exist a set of net present value (NPV) 
positive energy conservation investments in the market which for some reason have 
gone unrealized.  A steady stream of papers over the past thirty years have addressed 
(and questioned) the existence, magnitude, and persistence of such a gap.  An early 
argument for the existence of a gap appeared in a 1979 report detailing the results of the 
Harvard Business School Energy Project, in which authors concluded that if government 
were to make conservation a priority, the possibility of reducing energy consumption by 
30 or 40 percent while maintaining the current standards of living was not an 
unreasonable proposition [1].   
Any discussion about the existence, magnitude, and nature of an energy 
efficiency gap must define what the “gap” actually is and how it is to be measured.  Jaffe 
et al. (1994) identified five separate and distinct notions of optimality: the economists' 
economic potential, the technologists' economic potential, hypothetical potential, the 
narrow social optimum and the true social optimum.  The paper cautions that any 
analysis of the “gap” must be specific with regards to which definition of optimality is 
being used.  Figure 1 represents these different levels diagrammatically.   Following is a 
brief explanation of each of these levels: 
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• The economists’ economic potential may be achieved by eliminating existing market 
failures in the energy efficient technology market. 
• To attain the technologists’ economic potential, additional (non-market failure) 
barriers such as high discount rates and organizational inertia must be 
eliminated. 
• Approaching the problem from a practical point of view, the narrow social 
optimum may be achieved by eliminating those market failures whose solutions 
pass a societal cost-benefit test (but without accounting for any externalities). 
• Once the narrow social optimum has been achieved, the true social optimum may 
be achieved by internalizing any existing externalities.  Any difference between 
the narrow social optimum or the true social optimum and the hypothetical 
potential exists because there may be market failures for which there are no cost-
effective solutions. 
• The hypothetical potential may only be achieved when all market failures in the 
broader energy market are eliminated.  Achieving this potential is not only 
impossible, the authors say, but undesirable (if it is assumed that some market 
failures are most costly to correct than to leave in place). 
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Figure 1. Notions of energy-efficiency optimality (from Jaffe and Stavins, 1994). 
 
Many studies use the technologists’ economic potential as their “ideal level” of energy 
efficiency.  From a policy analysis perspective, however, this is not necessarily the 
correct level to target – the narrow social optimum seems like an achievable goal while the 
true social optimum would provide additional positive benefits.  The authors proceed to 
note that whether or not an energy gap exists, the diffusion of economically superior 
technologies is typically gradual.  Thus “… if the purpose of measuring the efficiency 
gap is to identify desirable government policy interventions, then what we need to 
know is whether the market barriers that cause slow diffusion can be mitigated by 
government intervention in such a way that overall resource allocation is improved.” [2] 
2.  BARRIERS 
Keeping in mind that the terminology for an energy-efficiency gap is not 
consistent across studies, it remains possible to list the potential barriers which have 
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been put forth by these studies and then to classify these barriers according to different 
classification schemes.  We will begin by looking at each of the proposed barriers 
individually. 
 
Information: Problems stemming from a lack of information or the uneven 
dissemination of information are frequently cited as forms of market failure.  It is critical 
to distinguish between different types of information problems, which in some cases 
have been confused in the literature.  Weimer and Vining make the distinction between 
imperfect information and information asymmetry, both of which are considered forms 
of market failure. [3]   
• Imperfect information refers to a lack of information provision and may be 
considered a public goods problem, since information itself may be considered a 
public good.  Public goods (in contract to pure private goods) are neither 
rivalrous nor excludable and thus will tend not to be supplied by the market.  A 
common example of a public good is a lighthouse – the benefits of a lighthouse 
accrue to multiple parties in a non-rivalrous and non-excludable manner – thus 
lighthouses must typically be provided by governments.  Similarly, information 
(for instance, data about technologies’ performance) may benefit multiple parties 
in a way that is non-rivalrous and non-excludable, and thus may not be provided 
by the market of its own accord.   
• Information asymmetry, on the other hand, refers to the uneven possession of 
information between different parties.  For example, if a seller has better 
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information about a product than a buyer, there exists an information asymmetry 
between the two actors and this may lead the buyer to purchase more or less of 
the product than under the alternative condition of symmetric information.   
To understand how problems related to information may affect the market for energy 
efficient technologies, it is useful to classify goods into search goods, experience goods, 
and post-experience (or credence) goods. Search goods allow evaluation by the 
consumer prior to purchase.  Experience goods only allow evaluation through use or 
consumption.  Post-experience or credence goods are difficult to evaluate, even after 
consumption. [3]  It has been suggested that the energy efficient technology market falls 
into this final category, given that many consumers lack the education or the means to 
make the necessary evaluation of performance even after using the good.  [4], [5]  
Pharmaceuticals are another oft-cited example of post-experience goods. 
 
Adverse selection: The problem of adverse selection is closely related to information 
asymmetry.  In a 1970 paper, Akerlof demonstrated how sales of “bad” used cars (a.k.a., 
“lemons”) in the used car market will tend to drive out “good” cars since it is typically 
impossible for the buyer to distinguish between the two types prior to purchase and 
because the rate of return for selling a “lemon” is higher than that of a “good” car.  This 
situation exists because a “lemon” can be considered an experience good, one whose 
quality can only be determined after using it for some period of time.  Thus, information 
asymmetry encourages the sales of “lemons,” eventually crowding the market with 
inferior goods – hence the phenomenon of adverse selection.  This situation is also 
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dependent on the willingness of the seller opportunistically sell a “lemon” at the same 
price of good car. [5], [6]  It is not hard to translate this to the market for energy efficient 
technologies, especially if one accepts the hypothesis that such technologies are post-
experience goods (thus making it even more difficult to evaluate their performance). 
 
Principal-agent relationships: The problem of principal-agent relationships also has 
roots in the lack of perfect information held by all parties.  Such relationships exist 
because the objectives of employers (or principals) and their employees (agents) are not 
always in perfect alignment.  In a world of perfect information, principals would know 
everything known by their agents.  This situation is unlikely to obtain because there are 
costs associated with monitoring agents.  Thus there remains the possibility that agency 
loss, or the costs associated with discrepancies in the supervisory relationship, will occur. 
[3] 
A corollary of the principal-agent problem is the requirement that investments 
will satisfy either short payback periods or high internal rates of return (or “hurdle 
rates”) within a firm.  Such rates are set by the principal as a litmus test to ensure that 
investments undertaken by the agent carry a minimal amount of risk and are at least at 
profitable as the set minimum.  The result is that investments with lower returns (as is 
typical of energy-efficient retrofits) are passed by in favor of more profitable investments 
– for example, the expansion of production facilities.  It must also be noted that a firm’s 
decision to set higher hurdle rates is not itself a barrier to energy efficiency, but rather a 
response to address existing conditions in the market. 
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Hurdle rates are also related to the complexity of interactions within a firm.  
Decanio (1993) pointed out that corporations are not individuals and therefore cannot be 
expected to behave as such.  In the author’s words: “The individuals making up a 
business firm may all be rational seekers after their own interest, but the outcome of 
their collective action may be suboptimal.”  The structure, organization, and a myriad of 
other internal factors influence the decisions of a corporation, which cannot realize every 
profitable investment available.  A corporation’s decision to set hurdle rates higher than 
the cost of capital can be interpreted as a response to the principal-agent problem in that 
it increases the chance of an acceptable return on investment.  This relates to the 
phenomenon that corporations may tolerate some degree of management inefficiency as 
long as the bottom line remains profitable [7]. 
In a later paper, Decanio and Watkins (1998) further explored the notion that the 
characteristics of a corporate entity will affect its energy efficiency investment decisions.  
By using the choice to participate or not participate in the EPA’s Green Lights program 
as a proxy for willingness to invest in energy efficiency, the authors attempted to show 
that certain properties of a corporation will affect their investment decisions.  By 
estimating a discrete choice regression over firms with the choice of joining the program, 
results revealed that a firm’s number of employees, earnings per share, the historical 
rate of growth of industry earnings, expected future earnings growth, price/earnings 
ratio, industrial sector, and EPA region all had an influence on the dependent variable.  
In general, there was a positive correlation between a firm’s performance and its 
likelihood of joining the Green Lights program.  The authors concluded that this “… is 
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evidence that the conventional model of investment decision making is inadequate in 
this case.”  In other words, there exists a heterogeneity among firms which limits them 
from being lumped into the single orthodox notion of a firm [8]. 
More recently, Martin et al. (2012) found that among manufacturing plants in the 
UK, the adoption of “climate-friendly management practices” correlate with the 
presence of an energy or environmental manager.  The correlation is strongest when this 
manager’s position is close to that of the CEO, but drops precipitously when the CEO 
assumes this responsibility.  The study also found that such management practices are 
associated with higher productivity and less energy usage. [9] 
 
Split or misaligned incentives: The problem of split incentives assumes its most 
common form in a landlord-tenant relationship in which the landlord owns a building 
and leases space out to a tenant or tenants.  These tenants are responsible for paying 
their own energy bills while the landlord is responsible for the building infrastructure.  
The tenants have little incentive to improve the building’s energy systems since they do 
not own the building, while the landlord has little incentive to improve the energy 
systems since the tenants pay the rent.  Thus any possible investment in energy 
efficiency is left in stalemate. 
The landlord-tenant relationship is not the only instance of split or misaligned 
incentives.  Hirst and Brown (1990) note that there many different parties involved in 
the design, construction, and operation of buildings – including owners, engineers, 
architects, builders, contractors, and others.  The involvement of these “intermediaries” 
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leads to more weight being placed on first cost rather than life cycle costs, thus limiting 
investment in higher cost, more energy-efficient options. [10] 
There have been several policy tools targeted at overcoming problems associated 
with split incentives.  One example is “on-bill financing,” a financial arrangement in 
which a utility company (or a third party lender) will provide financing to a building 
owner with the specific intent of performing an energy-efficient building retrofit.  The 
loan is then paid back to the lender through the energy cost savings generated by the 
retrofit.  This payment  is integrated with the owner’s utility bills (hence the name “on-
bill financing”), which simplifies the transaction and reduces the chance of the owner 
defaulting on the repayment.  An important property of most on-bill financing 
arrangements is the provision that the responsibility for repaying the loan is tied to the 
building and not to the building owner.  Thus if the building owner sells the building, 
the loan moves with the building to the new owner. 
 
Risk and uncertainty: Any projections of energy cost savings due to retrofit investment 
will include some degree of uncertainty.  Contributing factors may include the 
performance of the technology, the future cost of energy, and the length of ownership of 
the building in question.  Such uncertainty produces a corresponding degree of risk in 
the investment.  Several studies have demonstrated that certainty is a highly-valued 
determinant in making decisions.  It has been observed that people must be 
compensated disproportionately more to give up something they already have than to 
obtain something they do not. [11]  It has also been shown that residential consumers 
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increase their discount rates 5-6 percentage points when dealing with energy-efficient 
investments in their residences even when the risks are relatively small. [12] Samuelson 
and Zeckhauser refer to this phenomenon as the “status quo bias.” [13] 
 
Hidden costs: Some have argued that there is not an “energy efficiency gap” because the 
engineering models which were used to estimate the gap somehow failed to account for 
hidden costs. [14]  Such costs may include the cost of information gathering, the 
assessment of alternative strategies, decrements in productivity due to the 
implementation of new equipment and procedures, and managerial costs. [15]  Hein and 
Blok (1994) found that hidden costs represented a non-negligible portion of total 
investment costs within firms, and that this percentage increased for more advanced 
retrofits or for smaller firms. [16]  The same trend was reported by Kulakowski. [17] 
Hidden costs should not be confused with transaction costs, which some have 
argued represent an often-overlooked though substantial contribution to the economics 
of energy efficiency. [5], [18]  It is the case, however, that some transaction costs may be 
hidden, and that some hidden costs may be transaction costs. 
 
Heterogeneity: Not all buildings are the same.  This simple statement also implies that 
not all building owners are the same, nor are building operators or facilities managers.  
While heterogeneity is rarely used to explain the energy-efficiency gap by itself, it is 
commonly used to explain why other barriers are so difficult to surmount; that is, it is an 
important factor in economic models focused on the macro-level but not in engineering 
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models focused on the micro-level.  As a simple example, consider two identical 
buildings with the same rooftop solar array.  A building located in Los Angeles will 
experience a very different energy savings than a building located in Alaska.  
Heterogeneity is also used to describe differences in consumers and their preferences for 
energy-efficient technologies. 
 
Access to capital or financing: It has been suggested that the rules governing the use of 
capital preclude investment in energy-efficient technologies because they are typically 
more expensive than their less efficient counterparts.  Some of these rules, particularly 
those governing payback periods and hurdle rates discussed previously, are imposed by 
the firms themselves and may be aimed at preventing agency loss (also discussed 
previously). 
 
Bounded rationality: Herbert Simon’s concept of “bounded rationality” suggests that 
consumers do not have the necessary cognitive capacity to process all the information 
available on a specific topic, and therefore must resort to heuristic approaches which 
require less computation.  The term “bounded rationality” thus reflects the notion that 
consumers are rational up to a certain point, but that limits on the ability to process data 
set restrictions on such behavior.  When presented with a difficult decision, actors may 
first try to simplify the choices available before choosing in a rational manner.  Simon 
referred to this process as “satisficing,” in which individuals attempt to arrive at a 
satisfactory solution instead of (necessarily) the optimal solution. [19] 
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  In accordance with this theory, several studies on residential consumers have 
shown that they do not always make decisions based purely on economic 
considerations, or that they make incorrect calculations.  There is evidence that 
residential householders frequently make inefficient decisions related to energy 
consumption [20] and that consumers exhibit systematically incorrect biases when 
comparing the fuel economy of different cars (i.e., by failing to recognize that a fuel 
economy increase from 15 MPG to 20 MPG is equivalent to an increase from 30 MPG to 
40 MPG). [21]  Neij et al. (2009) argued that residential consumers’ investment decisions 
cannot be predicted solely by economic variables.  Their review of existing literature 
suggested that consumers largely ignore operating costs when making decisions about 
household appliances.  This may be attributed either to a lack of understanding of how 
to calculate operating cost savings, or to consumers’ weighting of non-financial criteria 
as more important (e.g., comfort, aesthetics, reliability, etc.). [22] 
Other studies have looked at whether or not consumers may take environmental 
considerations in to account when making decisions about residential conservations 
measures.  Achnicht (2011) performed a choice experiment on residential consumers in 
Germany regarding their decision to invest in a new heating system or improved 
thermal insulation for their home.  They found environmental benefits (i.e., CO2 
emissions) to have a significant effect on choices of heating systems but not for choices 
of insulation type.  This was interpreted to mean that consumers may find it easier to 
associate the reduction of CO2 emissions with a new heating system than with new 
insulation. 
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Credibility and trust: This refers to consumers’ attitudes toward information providers.  
In an important study by Craig and McCann (1978), pamphlets on how to request 
energy conservation information were sent to consumers by one of two sources: the 
New York State Public Service Commission (high credibility) or the local utility 
company (low credibility).  Except for the source, the information presented was 
identical.  Consumers receiving the pamphlet from the high credibility source were 
twice as likely to request more information. [23] 
 
Form of information: Studies have shown that the form of information has an important 
effect on how much impact it has on the target audience.  In general, it has been 
suggested that people will evaluate information differently depending on how it is 
presented, which is one of the tenets of “prospect theory” put forth by Kahneman and 
Tversky. [24]  More specifically, DuPont (1998) looked at consumers’ ability to interpret 
energy labels on household appliances in the U.S. and Thailand and found that while 
Thai labels more effectively conveyed data about energy efficiency, consumers in both 
countries had difficulty interpreting the information properly.  In most cases, the end 
result is that consumers place an inordinate weighting on first cost, often to the 
detriment of other metrics such as long term cost savings. [25]  It has also been observed 
that the timing and format of how television sets’ energy use information is presented 
will affect consumers’ choice of products. [26] 
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Impact of Social Norms: Values and social norms are difficult to quantify, and research 
has suggested that they only play an important role in energy conservation behaviors 
when they do not cost more than more energy intensive alternatives.  Limited changes 
in residential energy use behavior have been observed when presented with information 
comparing one household’s consumption with that of neighboring houses. [27] 
Inertia: Inertia is an acknowledgment that human beings prefer to have set ways of 
doing things.  When applied to the energy efficiency gap, this term may refer to 
organizational inertia, in which entrenched ways of doing something prevent new and 
innovative methods from being used.  One example resides with the actual construction 
of buildings – building codes and existing methods have been suggested as hindrances 
to increased use of newer and more energy-efficient technologies. [28] 
 
Power: A notion taken from behavioral economics, the term power in the context of 
energy efficiency refers to the lack of influence of energy management employees within 
an organization.  In some ways this barrier is similar to the split incentives and 
asymmetric information barriers (discusses previously), in that agency loss may occur in 
an organization because those individuals with the relevant knowledge have limited 
power to implement changes. [5] 
 
Organizational culture: Organizational culture is defined as the sum of each constituent 
member’s values.  The influence of a member’s values is directly proportional to the 
rank of that individual within the organization. [5], [8] This is another concept that may 
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be difficult to quantify.  However, an obvious example where the leadership exerted 
influence over the direction of the organization is Apple, Inc., under the late Steve Jobs. 
 
Discount Rates: The topic of discount rates used by consumers has been a popular 
avenue for exploration since the late 1970s.  In a 1979 article examining discount rates 
used when considering the purchase of an air conditioner, Hausman found that 
consumers were utilizing annual discount rates as high as 26.4 percent.  Such values are 
much higher than discount rates typically used in engineering analyses and much 
higher than values commonly used for the cost of capital.  Hausman noted that such a 
finding does not surprise many economists, citing the “defective telescopic faculty,” or 
the tendency to discount at a rate much higher than the corresponding opportunity costs 
of investment in credit markets.  A possible solution to this “defect” is to directly 
incentivize the purchase of energy efficient equipment through tax subsidies or other 
similar policies.  The paper also noted that the discount rate varies inversely with 
income, with higher income classes using an implied discount rate much closer to the 
value derived from existing lending opportunities. [29] 
Hassett and Metcalf (1993) argue that such high discount rates are not 
unreasonable when sunk costs and uncertainty are factored into the consumer’s 
decision.  Drawing on their own previous work, they suggest that the appropriate 
hurdle rates for energy efficient investments are four to five times the hurdle rate 
without uncertainty.  Because the hurdle rates are so high, the authors conclude it is 
unlikely that tax subsidies will increase investment in energy conservation measures, 
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instead citing mandatory energy efficiency standards and consumption taxes as more 
effective methods. [30] 
Other studies have clarified that high discount rates used by consumers are not 
themselves a barrier, but rather a reaction to (or restatement of) other barriers.  It is thus 
fruitless to argue for a specific discount rate. [2], [5], [31] 
 
3.  TAXONOMIES OF BARRIERS TO ENERGY EFFICIENCY 
Before proceeding, we must first define the term “market failure.”  A market 
failure is described by Weimer and Vining as a “situation in which decentralized 
behavior does not lead to Pareto efficiency.  [These are] circumstances in which social 
surplus is larger under some alternative allocation to that resulting under the market 
equilibrium.” [3]  The four types of market failure include: public goods, externalities 
(both positive and negative), natural monopolies, and information asymmetries.  The 
majority of the barriers discussed in relation to energy efficiency do not fall into one of 
these categories, thus any analysis must be careful to distinguish between those barriers 
which are recognized as traditional market failures and those which are not.  Depending 
on the taxonomy being applied, there are additional distinctions (besides market failure 
vs. non-market failure) that should be made between barriers.  Although not an 
exhaustive list, the potential barriers discussed in the previous heading represent the 
most frequently-cited examples of each group.  We will next discuss the various 
taxonomies which have been developed to classify such barriers. 
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Orthodox economics offers perhaps the simplest taxonomy of barriers to energy-
efficiency – a binary “yes or no” approach which recognizes the validity of some barriers 
but not others.  Barriers considered valid by this school of thought include market 
externalities, imperfect information, adverse selection, principal-agent problems, 
misaligned incentives, hidden costs, access to financing, and risk.  “Invalid” barriers 
include any notions that deviate from the orthodox economic assumptions of rational 
market actors making profit-maximizing decisions under perfect information without 
transaction costs or market externalities.  These include a number of “behavioral” and 
“organizational” barriers (discussed below). 
Hirst and Brown (1993) offer a slightly different way of grouping barriers to 
increased energy efficiency.  Barriers are structural or behavioral. Structural barriers 
include limited access to capital, government fiscal and regulatory policies, codes and 
standards, and supply infrastructure limitations. Behavioral barriers include attitudes 
toward energy efficiency, perceived risk of energy-efficiency investments, information 
gaps, and misplaced incentives. [10] 
Weber (2007) expands on this taxonomy to include four groups of barriers: 
Institutional, market, organizational, or behavioral.  This classification system widens the 
narrow approach afforded by orthodox economics (by recognizing that real markets 
may violate traditional assumptions of firms), and simultaneously distinguishes 
between subgroups of the Hirst and Brown system. 
• Institutional barriers are created by political institutions (Weber gives state 
government and local authorities as examples).  Such barriers are large and 
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lumbering – they may be very influential but also hard to describe in a clear-cut 
manner, and typically have great inertia. 
• Market barriers result from macro-level glitches in the market as a whole, which 
in turn reflect existing institutional barriers.  Market barriers mostly affect 
rational actors (i.e., individuals and firms) attempting to increase their utilities. 
• Organizational barriers represent problems within the firms that constitute the 
market.  As discussed previously, there may exist the possibility for moral 
hazard and agency loss within organizations, and these may have adverse effects 
on a firm’s decisions and actions.  These barriers are not recognized by orthodox 
economics. 
• Behavioral barriers represent individuals’ decisions related to energy 
consumption.  Weber cites “social norms and lifestyle patterns” as being 
important members of this category, and may include lack of attention toward 
energy conservation or a perceived inability to influence the level of 
consumption.  These barriers are not recognized by orthodox economics. 
Weber notes that care must be taken when talking about barriers: “What is an obstacle to 
whom reaching what in energy conservation?”  There are four important caveats which 
must be remembered when utilizing the barrier approach.   
• The first caveat is that barriers map outcomes only to positive actions by actors.  
This means that changes which result from not doing something are not 
recognized by this model.  Thus conservation efforts, or the act of reducing 
19 
 
 
 
consumption of energy without the expansion of existing inputs, are not 
considered. 
• The second is the focus on only actions as a means to an end.  The purpose of the 
action is not questioned.  Ultimately, this leads to an emphasis on technical 
solutions. 
• Thirdly, the barrier framework implies an “ideal level of efficiency.”  As noted by 
Jaffe and Stavins (discussed previously), this level must be specified according to 
some baseline. 
• Lastly, Weber explains that the notion of “energy efficiency potential” carries 
normative assumptions: that less energy consumption is better for society 
because it reduces waste (in an economic sense). 
Weber’s key point is that barrier models only record positive actions.  When considered 
in conjunction with the Jaffe and Stavins framework shown in Figure 1, this shows that 
inputs into a barrier model of energy efficiency must be precisely defined. [32] 
Thollander et al. (2010) suggested a simplified three-group taxonomy which 
categorizes barriers by their relationship to the system they affect.  The technical (or 
micro level) regime includes economic barriers which are not considered traditional 
market failures, including hidden costs, access to capital, risk, and heterogeneity.  The 
technical regime applies to specific technologies and their associated costs.  The second 
group, the technological (or meso level) regime, still pertains to specific technologies but 
also adds in the dimension of human use of such technologies.  Members of this group 
include imperfect information, adverse selection, misaligned incentives, and form of 
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information, which except for the final member, are all economic barriers which are also 
considered traditional market failures.  The third and final group is the socio-technical (or 
macro) regime, which places more emphasis on the human-centered barriers, including 
bounded rationality, inertia, power, and culture.  This category matches closely to 
Weber’s behavioral barriers category. 
An alternative way of incorporating non-orthodox economic ideas into the 
analysis of barriers to energy-efficiency is suggested by Sorrell (2004).  He criticizes the 
Jaffe-Stavins framework on the grounds that it ignores contributions from transaction 
cost economics (TCE) and behavioral economics and thus cannot adequately describe 
decision-making in the real world.  Instead, he suggests that this framework must be 
modified to include inputs from both of these fields.  This approach is shown 
diagrammatically in Figure 2. 
  
 
Figure 2. Extending the orthodox model to include inputs from agency/information theory, 
transaction cost economics, and behavioral economics (from Sorrell, 2004) 
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According to this modified view, the more traditional notion of market failure falls short 
for several reasons: 1) It treats market failures as absolute rather than relative, 2) It does 
not allow for organizational failure, and 3) It relies too heavily on orthodox economic 
assumptions (such as perfect information).  This leads to a broad, three-part 
classification system of barriers: 
• Market failures (in the traditional sense, which may include externalities or 
asymmetric information) which may be corrected by government intervention, 
• Organization failures, or management failures on a firm-specific level, where the 
barrier may be overcome through task restructuring or proper managerial 
incentives within the firm, and 
• Non-failures, in which a firm is reacting to risk and hidden costs in a rational 
manner (for instance, by setting high internal hurdle rates to deal with 
uncertainty). 
The key contribution TCE toward understanding energy efficiency investments is the 
concept of bounded rationality (discussed previously).  There are two important 
corollaries to this idea: 1) That contracts are not complete, and 2) Transaction costs are 
unavoidable.  These corollaries encapsulate deficiencies of the orthodox approach.  Yet 
despite advancing our understanding of decision-making in the real world, TCE still 
falls short by failing to incorporate the true extent of limits in human judgment and 
cognitive processes.  In order to capture these individual shortcomings, Sorrell argues 
that elements from behavioral economics must be considered. 
22 
 
 
 
One popular formulation of behavioral economics is “prospect theory,” put forth 
by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) as an alternative to orthodox economic theory.  
Instead of relying on an expected utility function, prospect theory attempts to describe 
human decision-making under risk through the use of a value function.  The value 
function differs from the expected utility function in that it replaces probabilities with 
“decision weights,” allowing for losses to be treated separately from gains.  The slope of 
the function is typically steeper for losses. [24]  Sorrell cites two important features of the 
theory that bring to bear on energy efficiency decisions: 1) The certainty effect, in which 
certain outcomes are weighted more heavily than uncertain outcomes, and 2) Loss 
aversion, or the observation that the value function slope is more pronounced for 
negative outcomes. [5] 
Recently, Allcott and Greenstone (2012b) have questioned whether or not the 
energy efficiency gap exists to the extent that others have claimed (the authors cite two 
estimates which place the “gap” between 20% and 40% [1], [33]).  The paper clarifies that 
there are in fact two distinct forms of market failure at play, but that often they are 
inadvertently rolled into one.  The first possible market failure takes the form of energy 
use externalities that keep the price of energy artificially low.  The second possible 
market failure is information asymmetry, in which consumers do not have sufficient 
information to make educated decisions about investment in energy conservation.  If 
energy use externalities represent the only market barrier, then the proper government 
response is to apply a tax or a cap-and-trade system to force market actors to internalize 
those costs.  If the only market barrier is information asymmetry, however, then the 
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government’s first reaction should be to provide the appropriate information to the 
market through some sort of information provision mechanism (such as mandatory 
disclosure).  If this does not correct the failure, then more forceful policies (such as 
subsidies) may be applicable.  [14] 
Allcott/Greenstone and Sorrell agree that the separation of potential market 
failures is critical to understanding the energy efficiency gap.  Both explain that 
artificially low energy prices do not completely explain the existence of economic 
inefficiencies in the building retrofit market.  Both groups also argue that any policies 
targeting the gap must be custom-tailored to specific groups in order to address the 
heterogeneity that exists among different consumers.   Where these authors differ is 
their estimates of the magnitude of the energy efficiency gap – in contrast to Sorrell’s 
estimates, Allcott and Greenstone argue that the magnitude is actually quite small.  
Sorrell, on the other hand, does not rule out the possibility that significantly higher 
levels of economic and energy efficiency are possible. 
A final framework which must be mentioned is the theory of “diffusion of 
innovations” put forth by Rogers (1962).  The theory describes how new ideas and 
technologies (i.e., innovations) are adopted (or not adopted) by members of a society.  
Rogers’ framework comprises five different groups of adopters in any society: 
Innovators, early adopters, the early majority, the late majority, and the laggards. [34]  
This framework has been applied to the diffusion of energy efficient technologies in the 
building industry.  Based on the premise that building designers do not make energy 
efficiency a guiding principle in their projects, some researchers have argued that a 
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fundamental element impeding wider diffusion of many ECMs is a lack of knowledge 
and experience on the part of the architects and engineers.  Because new designs are 
often based on the precedent of previous designs, this lack of information or 
understanding may serve to hinder diffusion of a certain technology. [35], [36]  This 
relates closely to specific barriers such as information asymmetry and inertia (both 
discussed previously). 
 
4.  THE IMPORTANCE OF BUILDING RETROFITS 
We have so far discussed specific barriers to increased energy efficiency, 
classification systems to categorize these barriers, and considerations related to how an 
energy efficiency gap is measured.  We now turn to one specific area in which an energy 
efficiency gap may have important consequences: existing buildings. 
The Energy Efficiency Buildings (EEB) HUB, a Department of Energy-sponsored 
research consortium headquartered at the Navy Yard in Philadelphia, The primary goals 
of the consortium are to stimulate private investment in energy-efficient measures in 
new and existing buildings in the Greater Philadelphia region in order to reduce carbon 
emissions and create a market environment that incentivizes such investment.  As part 
of this effort, researchers were tasked with determining policy, market, and behavioral 
(PMB) barriers preventing the adoption of energy efficient building system technologies 
and how these barriers may be surmounted by modifying the existing financial, policy, 
and regulatory framework. 
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In a report commissioned by the EEB HUB, eConsult Corporation (2011) noted 
that “… 47% of the commercial and industrial space in the Philadelphia area is identified 
as potential candidates for energy retrofits,” covering 4,201 buildings with 154 million 
square feet of space.  eConsult estimates this retrofit potential could generate $618 
million in local spending and support 23,500 jobs. 
Several recent publications have highlighted the importance of stimulating such 
investment in energy efficiency in the built environment.  In a report by McKinsey and 
Company (2009), researchers estimated that the US could reduce its non-transportation 
energy consumption by 23% by the year 2020 by investing in energy efficient programs 
and technologies. [33]  An analysis by the American Council for an Energy-Efficiency 
Economy suggested a 45%-69% reduction in energy consumption across residential and 
commercial buildings in the US is possible by 2050. [37]  The US Energy Information 
Administration, in its Annual Energy Outlook 2012, projects a possible 83% energy 
reduction in the commercial sector by 2035 in a best case scenario compared to a 
reference case. [38] 
 
5.  THE MICROECONOMIC RETROFIT DECISION 
Moving away from the theoretical underpinnings of energy efficiency and its 
barriers, we begin a discussion of research that has been performed on actual decision-
making processes related to building retrofits.  These studies are important because in 
many cases they substantiate the ideas which have been described above and provide an 
empirical foundation to further our understanding of the market mechanisms being 
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discussed.  Specifically, such examples may illustrate where barriers actually affect the 
decision process and where there may be room for policies to improve existing market, 
organizational, and behavioral tendencies. 
Parker et al. (2000) examined the energy efficiency investment criteria of 26 
corporate decision-makers in the Pacific Northwest.  The decision-makers were 
responsible for making decisions about a range of building categories, including 
healthcare, retail spaces, and office spaces.  Results of the interviews suggested that a 
majority of corporate decision-makers budget in advance for energy efficient 
investments and that the typical decision process is “bottom up,” where the decision is 
initiated at the lower levels of an organization and consequently makes its way up the 
internal management hierarchy until it is ultimately approved or rejected by a senior 
manager.  The funds for investment are typically considered to be a capital outlay rather 
than an operating expense.  The rank ordering of criteria applied to energy efficiency 
investment decisions are: 
• the technology’s track record 
• financial performance estimates 
• perceived effects on tenant comfort and satisfaction 
• defined investment priorities 
The authors found that the technical and financial assessments of an investment, two 
critical components of the decision-making process, tend to occur at a very early stage.  
If the investment opportunity passes muster in both of these dimensions, the final 
approval from the senior manager may be relatively quick.  However, this does not 
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mean that the process is simple or straightforward.  Instead, the process involves a 
number of steps, typically in this order: 
• tracking of problems and needs 
• investigation and technical assessment of equipment options 
• financial analysis 
• selection of a preferred option 
• approval  
• procurement 
The most common financial criterion used by respondents was simple payback period, 
with a fairly short acceptable payback period of 2 years.  The next most common 
measure used was rate of return (ROR), with an average minimum acceptable value of 
12%, although these ranged from 8% up to 12%.  Net present value was only reported to 
be used by 3 of the 26 firms interviewed.  Overall, there was a wide range of investment 
priorities among respondents.  Energy efficiency was cited by some firms as a high 
priority, though most rated it somewhere in the middle or bottom end. [39]  These 
results provide additional evidence for the existence of several barriers previously 
mentioned, particularly those based on transaction cost economics and behavioral 
economics. 
In the Deloitte survey of organizations that had undergone at least one LEED-
certified building retrofit, it was found that “greater indoor environmental air quality” 
and “corporate environmental commitment” ranked as the two highest motivations for 
pursuing such a green retrofit.  “Operational cost savings from energy efficiency” was 
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tied for third along with “value of public relations and free publicity” and “attraction 
and retention of corporate workforce.”  The authors found it surprising that cost 
considerations did not rank higher in this list.  When asked to rank the top impacts of 
undergoing an EER, the greatest increases were reported as “goodwill/brand equity” 
and “employee comfort.” [40]  These findings are generally different from most other 
studies, which have found environmental principles to reside near the bottom of the 
priority list.  This difference is likely explained by the fact that inclusion required the 
organization to have undergone a LEED-certified retrofit, biasing the sample in a certain 
direction. 
Jones (2009) used semi-structured interviews of 12 decision-makers and a meta-
analysis of existing literature to review energy conservation decisions by different 
organizations.  By using a case study approach, Jones was able to generate an optimal 
decision process for evaluating and implementing energy conservation measure in 
buildings.  He cited a general “lack of understanding at all levels” as an important 
barrier to increased adoption of energy efficiency technologies. [41]  This generalization 
seems to include pieces of many different theoretical barriers previously discussed, 
including imperfect information and bounded rationality. 
Similarly, Levitsky et al. (2011) found that that the common barriers to 
investment include a lack of understanding on the part of decision-makers, a scarcity of 
financial modeling tools, and the need for increased transparency of building energy 
consumption data.  These data came from a review of secondary research on various 
value delivery systems and delivery models for energy efficient retrofits. [42]  In general, 
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these findings match closely to the findings of Parker (2000) and Jones (2009) while 
giving some additional details on the specifics of contractual relations and possible 
misaligned incentives. 
Other efforts have suggested that a general lack of education and awareness are 
important detractors from the retrofit decision process.  Sachs et al. (2006) found that 
building owners may be ill-informed about the different options they have to make their 
buildings more efficient [43].  Danfoss (2010) conducted surveys with owners, architects, 
engineers, mechanical contractors, and OEM manufacturers, and obtained results which 
acknowledged the persistent importance of first cost considerations as a barrier to wider 
implementation of many ECMs.  One way to surmount this barrier is not to create “more 
and better products,” but to educate and train the people that use existing products.  A 
related problem is the concern of building operators regarding the complexity of new 
technologies.  One respondent was cited as saying: 
“The drawbacks are that the end users have a large learning curve on 
maintaining these facilities.  There are a lot of practices that been in 
place for the last 50 years that the building engineers know backwards 
and forwards and there are a lot of things that could be taken for 
granted that could affect health.  The costs can be debated, but the 
concern I have is for the end user to properly maintain these things so 
that you get the long-term efficiency that you are promised upfront.” 
 
In general, these studies affirm the existence of several previously-mentioned barriers, 
including lack of information, the presence of uncertainty, bounded rationality, and 
inertia. [44] 
Decision support tools have been developed to help guide decisions on energy 
management,  though statistics on the use of these tools is scarce [45–48].  In a Master’s 
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thesis, Estes (2011) reported that use of payback period as a criterion is frequently used 
by organizations when considering investment in ECMs, and developed a spreadsheet 
to help users calculate more sophisticated financial metrics. [49]  Sayce and Ellison 
(2007) proposed a set of criteria which, when taken together, form the basis of a 
property-specific sustainability index.  These criteria include energy efficiency, climate 
control, pollutants, waste and water, adaptability, accessibility, occupier, and contextual 
fit. [50]  Hendricken et al. (2012) modeled the performance of packages of ECMs for 
commercial retrofits and determined the least cost alternatives for a given energy 
consumption reduction level. [51] 
Several recent papers have proffered multi-criteria and multi-objective 
optimization models related to energy decisions and building retrofits.  Greening and 
Bernow (2004) presented an overview of multi-criteria decision-making models of 
energy and environmental policies. [52]  Diakaki et al. (2008) applied multi-objective 
optimization techniques to the problem of choosing the most appropriate ECMs for a 
building retrofit and found that while the technique may work in a simplified 
hypothetical situation, the technique was inadequate when applied to a real world 
situation due to “competitiveness between constraints.” [53]  Asadi et al. (2012) applied a 
multi-objective optimization model to a residential building, showing that although 
complicated, the approach is a viable way to help stakeholders assess the tradeoffs of 
alternative ECMs. [54]  Kumbaroglu and Madlener (2012) evaluated both the technical 
and economic merits of retrofit alternatives for an office building in Germany.  They 
found that not only does the price of energy have a significant effect on the value of a 
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retrofit investment, but that widely-fluctuating energy prices often make it worthwhile 
to simply wait to invest. [55]  It seems, however, that the commercial importance of 
these relatively sophisticated tools and approaches is minor. 
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CHAPTER II : SURVEYING THE MAJOR FACTORS AFFECTING THE 
COMMERCIAL BUILDING RETROFIT DECISION 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
1.1 The importance of commercial building retrofits 
Primary energy consumption in the United States has roughly tripled in the last 
50 years, from approximately 30 quadrillion BTU in 1949 to approximately 98 
quadrillion BTU in 2010 [56], and the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) 
projects that energy consumption will continue to grow at 0.3% annually between 2010 
and 2035 [38].  In the United States, the buildings sector accounted for about 41% of 
primary energy consumption in 2010, 44% more than the transportation sector and 36% 
more than the industrial sector [57].  Within the building sector, commercial buildings 
alone represent just under 20% of U.S. primary energy consumption, and thus have 
become prime candidates for policies targeted at reducing energy use.  Newer buildings 
tend to be more energy-efficient than older buildings.  But in urban areas where a large 
number of older buildings are still in use, such improvements in new construction may 
not combat high energy use by existing structures.  Within the greater Philadelphia area, 
it is estimated that 77% of the existing building stock was built prior to 1990 and that 
47% of the existing commercial and industrial building stock is eligible for an energy-
efficient retrofit [58].  Such statistics highlight the importance of building retrofits in 
reducing energy consumption and lead to the question of how to encourage investment 
in this area. 
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1.2 The “energy-efficiency gap” 
The term “energy efficiency gap” originated in engineering analyses indicating 
that there may exist a set of net present value (NPV) positive energy conservation 
investments in the market which for some reason have gone unrealized.  A steady 
stream of papers over the past thirty years have addressed (and questioned) the 
existence, magnitude, and persistence of such a gap [2], [7], [10], [29–31], [59], [60].  Any 
discussion of a “gap” – and also of potential solutions to correct it – is made complex by 
virtue of the economic assumptions made regarding markets and market actors’ 
behavior in such a situation.  The politicization of climate change has further 
complicated matters.  Regardless of how a “gap” is defined, it seems useful to identify 
corrective actions that will encourage not only energy efficiency, but also encourage 
economic efficiency.  A number of potential barriers to increased investment in energy 
efficiency have been identified, and several taxonomies for classifying these barriers 
have been proposed [15], [31], [32], [59], [61].  Information asymmetry, uncertainty, and 
“split incentives” emerge as the more common examples of such barriers. 
 
1.3 The Energy Efficient Buildings HUB 
The Energy Efficient Buildings Hub (EEB Hub, formerly known as the Greater 
Philadelphia Innovation Cluster, or GPIC) was established in Philadelphia by the U.S. 
Department of Energy (DOE) as an Energy-Regional Innovation Cluster in 2011.  EEB 
Hub was tasked with the following mission: 
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1. Develop and deploy to the building industry a state-of-the-art modeling platform 
to integrate design, construction, commissioning, and operation; 
2. Demonstrate the market viability of integrating energy saving technologies for 
whole building solutions at the Philadelphia Navy Yard and elsewhere in the 
region; 
3. Identify policies that accelerate market adoption of energy efficient retrofits of 
commercial buildings and support policy makers in the development of such 
policies in the Greater Philadelphia region;   
4. Inform, train, and educate people who design, own, construct, maintain, or 
occupy buildings about proven energy saving strategies and technologies; 
5. Help launch ventures with new and existing companies that will exploit market 
opportunities for providing whole building energy saving solutions.   
To accomplish these goals, the Hub’s research efforts were divided into the following 
major subject areas: Design Tools, Integrated Technologies and Systems, Policy, Markets 
and Behavior, Education and Workforce, and Demonstration and Deployment.  As part 
of the Policy, Markets and Behavior (PMB) team, Drexel University was tasked with 
bridging the space between technologies and the markets which use them. 
 
1.4 The microeconomics of the retrofit decision process 
In accordance with EEB’s goal to encourage greater investment in energy 
efficient technologies, it is necessary to first look at how market actors choose to adopt 
(or not adopt) such technologies.  It is difficult to broadly characterize all such decision 
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processes since there is significant heterogeneity in the specifics of each decision, 
however, it should be possible to make some observations that are generally applicable 
to a wide range of these decisions.  Such observations may illustrate where barriers 
actually affect the decision process and where there may be room for policies to improve 
existing market, organizational, and behavioral tendencies. 
Several analyses have cited a “lack of understanding” or “lack of information” as 
important barriers to increased adoption of energy efficiency technologies [43], [44].  
This generalization seems to include pieces of many different theoretical barriers 
previously discussed, including imperfect information and bounded rationality.  Other 
studies have reported that decision-makers commonly use “rule of thumb” metrics such 
as simple payback period to evaluate retrofit investment options even though this metric 
does not provide accurate information on the worth of the investment [39], [42], [49].  In 
one study, net present value (a more appropriate metric to use) was only reported by 3 
of the 26 firms interviewed [39].  The predominance of simple payback period as a 
“metric” is examined in this study. 
 
1.5 “Split incentives” 
The term “split incentives” is commonly used to refer to principal-agent 
problems in the rental market and is commonly mentioned as a barrier to increased 
energy efficiency in the building sector [8], [10], [33], [60], [62].    A typical situation 
involves a building owner who chooses to not invest in a rental property because it is 
the tenant who would realize the energy cost savings (with the assumption that this 
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would not lead to a higher rent for the owner).  By the same token, the tenant will not 
invest in the building because they do not own it.  In terms of energy efficiency, the end 
result is an investment stalemate.  While the phenomenon of split incentives is 
commonly cited as a barrier to greater energy efficiency, few efforts have been made to 
characterize its precise nature and quantify the size of its effect. 
 
1.6 Research basis and goals 
The basis and directives of this survey research were provided by several other research 
efforts being done as part of the EEB Hub effort.  The most important of these is the 
Advanced Energy Retrofit market model (AER model) designed by researchers at 
United Technologies Research Corporation.  This model is designed to predict energy 
consumption (and energy savings) for a given region and building stock at five-year 
increments into the future.  The model contains a library of 26 individual ECMs (shown 
in Table 1) bundled into 103 unique combinations, or “packages,” which can then be 
selected as retrofit options (Appendix 1 shows the different combinations of specific 
calculating changes in energy consumption by the building stock over time).  Error! 
Reference source not found. shows a schematic representation of the AER model and its 
inputs, including a set of decision parameters used to decide which ECM packages 
would be selected by a “virtual decision-maker” (i.e., a building owner or property 
manager).  As discussed in the methods section, the semi-structured and structured 
survey instruments were designed so that the results could help tune these decision 
parameters. 
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Figure 3. Schematic of AER market model and role of the survey results 
 
Table 1. Individual ECMs considered in energy modeling/surveying (see questions 10A-10D in 
Appendix 3 for detailed descriptions of each ECM and associated assumptions) 
T-5 lighting upgrade from T-8 lighting 
LED (light emitting diode) lighting upgrade 
High efficiency elevator upgrade 
Double pane window upgrade 
White roof upgrade 
Insulated roof upgrade from R-15 to R-30 
Green roof upgrade 
Insulated walls upgrade from R-6 to R-11 
High-efficiency cooling upgrade 
High-efficiency heating upgrade 
Variable-air-volume (VAV) system upgrade 
Radiant Heating/Cooling and Dedicated Outdoor Air System 
Switching to a heat pump 
Switching to a ground-source heat pump 
Central boiler upgrade from 70% to 95% 
Photovoltaic (solar) installation 
Smart grid controls / metering 
Central chiller plant upgrade 
Temperature Reset Strategy 
Daylighting 
Combined heat and power (CHP) system 
Plug load control (more efficient equipment, better management of equipment, etc.) 
Weatherization (reduce air exchange through sealing cracks, etc.) 
Occupancy sensors 
Shading (screens or overhangs to reduce solar gain during summer) 
Commissioning 
Future energy consumption/savings 
Building energy simulation 
Market adoption of combination of technologies 
Construction 
data 
Policies 
Exogenous 
variables 
Decision 
variables 
Cost data 
Survey results 
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2.  METHODS 
In an effort to better characterize the microeconomic decision process used for 
evaluating energy efficient buildings retrofits, and specifically to provide a closer 
examination of the effect of “split incentives” on this process, we relied on three sources 
of data: 
• The 2011 Energy Efficiency Indicator (EEI) survey conducted by the Johnson 
Controls Institute for Building Efficiency,  
• A series of semi-structured, extensive one-on-one interviews with decision-
makers, and  
• A structured online survey designed to further explore the findings from the 
semi-structured interviews. 
The results from each of these three data sources are examined and then cross-
referenced with each other in order to provide a more holistic picture of the decision 
factors affecting EER investment.  Details of each source are described below. 
 
2.1 The 2011 Energy Efficiency Indicator (EEI) survey  
The 2011 EEI survey was the fifth annual survey conducted online by the 
Johnson Controls Institute for Building Efficiency in partnership with the International 
Facility Management Association (IFMA) and the Urban Land Institute (ULI).  The 
survey was international in scope, covering 13 different countries, and asked business 
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executives about “their management practices, investment plans, technology integration 
and financing approaches” pertaining to energy-efficiency and real estate decisions [63].  
For the purposes of this analysis, the data was filtered to include only those responses 
from the United States in which answers were given in terms of US dollars. 
 
2.2 Semi-structured interviews 
To better characterize the key factors that contribute to decisions regarding the 
energy retrofit of commercial office space, researchers from Drexel University conducted 
two stages of stakeholder surveying: in the first stage, a series of semi-structured 
interviews allowed for open-ended responses from the subjects to uncover factors that 
might be overlooked by a more rigid interview format. In the second stage, a structured, 
stated preference survey was conducted to better characterize the findings from the 
semi-structured interviews (described in the next section).  The semi-structured 
interviews examined the key factors that influence decisions regarding the use of 
energy-saving measures, their relative weight in the decision-making process, and how 
these factors may or may not differ across stakeholder groups (i.e., building owners vs. 
architects). 
 The interview was administered to 16 stakeholders from 15 different 
organizations over the course of approximately six weeks.  Each of the organizations 
was located either within the Philadelphia metropolitan region or the surrounding 
suburban areas.  The breakdown of respondents by primary role was 36% 
owner/developer, 43% architect/engineer/consultant, and 21% property/facility 
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managers.  Interview subjects were recruited through email and by word of mouth.  
Respondents included building owners and managers, architects, engineers, developers, 
and consultants.  The interviews were administered in person or by phone and lasted 
between 30 minutes and 1.5 hours per respondent.  The interview consisted of two 
primary sections: 
• Background Information: Includes questions about the individual’s role in the 
building design/development/retrofit process, what type of buildings they 
typically work with, and the area in which their buildings are located. 
• Retrofit Decision Factors:  Includes questions about specific triggers for building 
retrofits, the barriers that must be considered, what types of efficiency measures 
are targeted, and what metrics or models are used to assist in making the 
decisions.  When possible, specific target values were elicited for the various 
metrics.  Questions covered the many general areas regarding building retrofit 
decisions.  For this analysis we chose to focus on a small selection of those areas: 
 Factors affecting the choice of a new or non-standard technology in the 
retrofit process. 
 How the performance of new technologies is estimated prior to installation. 
 Metrics used in making decisions about retrofits (both financial and non-
financial). 
 Acceptable or target values for these metrics. 
Following subject approval, responses to these questions were recorded with a digital 
audio device.  In cases where subjects preferred not to have their responses recorded, 
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notes were taken and interviews were scored during or immediately following the 
conversation.  The full survey instrument is shown in Appendix 2.  Responses to each 
question were scored and tabulated into a single database for analysis. 
 
2.3 Structured stated-preference surveys 
Lastly, a structured stated-preference survey was conducted to more precisely 
quantify the decision factors identified during the semi-structured interviews.  This 
survey was administered to 206 stakeholders from a wide range of different 
organizations over the course of approximately two months.   A convenience sample of 
survey respondents was recruited through email, word of mouth, and through a paper 
mailing to a mailing list of attendees from a local facilities management tradeshow.  
Respondents included building owners, facilities managers, architects, engineers, 
developers, vendors, maintenance personnel and consultants.  While respondents were 
allowed to answer the questions based on any experience within the United States, the 
majority of respondents were from the Mid-Atlantic region. 
 Survey design and development was a lengthy and intensive process, requiring 
approximately four months to complete the final product.  As discussed in subheading 
1.6 above, the design basis for the survey was informed by three main sources: 
• The AER market model. A primary set of goals for the structured survey was to 
generate data that could later be used to fine-tune parameters in the market 
model.  These include acceptable values for payback periods, perceptions of 
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individual ECMs, as well as the relative weights of financial and non-financial 
factors (addressed by the conjoint question).  The specifics of the AER market 
model internals is proprietary information and is thus not discussed here in 
detail, however, it may be understood that each question in the structured 
survey was designed in a way to produce data that can be “plugged in” to the 
market model. 
• Energy modeling.  The modeling work of Hendricken et al. (2012) was used as a 
basis for many of the questions related to the hypothetical building retrofit.  The 
Hendricken effort, in turn, was partially informed by data in the AER market 
model.  Thus there was a three-way interdependency between the survey 
instrument, the energy modeling, and the market model.  
• The semi-structured interviews.  The semi-structured interviews were designed 
to elicit factors that might not otherwise be considered in a more formal survey.  
One benefit of having done the semi-structured interviews first was the 
recognition that building owners willing to take a survey are difficult to find.  
Thus the structured survey was designed so that the respondent pool could 
include not just building owners, but also the architects, engineers, consultants, 
property managers and other who advise them in their decisions.  
The survey was administered either as an online format, using the proprietary web 
platform Qualtrics, or in a paper and pencil format.  The survey was designed to take 
approximately 20 minutes to complete.  Recruitment of subjects relied on multiple 
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approaches, including word of mouth, a dedicated table at the GreenBuild 2012 
conference in San Francisco, email lists through EEB Hub, and a paper mailing to 
roughly 600 attendees from a local facilities management trade show in November 2012.  
While the precise breakdown of subjects from each source was not tracked, it is 
estimated that a majority of subjects were recruited from the paper mailing (~100 
subjects), followed by the Greenbuild conference (~40-50 subjects). 
The instrument (shown in Appendix 3) consisted of the following primary 
sections: 
• Background Information: This section included questions about the individual’s 
role in the building design/development/retrofit process, what type of buildings 
they typically work with, years of experience related to EERs, and the portion of 
working time devoted to EERs. 
• Retrofit Package Selection for a Hypothetical Office Building: This section 
presented respondents with a hypothetical three-story office building and asked 
them to make certain assumptions about its location, tenancy type (owner-
occupied vs. leased to tenants), responsibility for paying the utility bills, and the 
type of organization that owns the building (e.g., private sector vs. non-profit 
institution).  Building owners were requested to answer these questions from 
their own (or their organization’s) point of view.  Other respondents (non-
owners) were asked to answer the questions from the point of view of a building 
owner they had previously worked with.  Specific questions in this section 
included those on: 
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 Perceived attractiveness of individual retrofit technologies for the 
hypothetical building, such as double-pane windows or white roof upgrades. 
 The length of simple payback period for a retrofit package most likely to be 
considered for adoption. 
 The effect that an additional metric (incremental internal rate of return) has 
on this decision. 
As previously discussed, the specifics of a number of questions for this survey 
were based on building energy simulation work done by Hendricken et al. (2012), which 
was also done in conjunction with the EEB work on the AER market model.  Figure 4 
shows data from the Hendricken et al. effort in which modeled values for energy use 
intensity by each of the 103 retrofit packages are plotted against their respective first cost 
values and an efficient frontier is generated.  Those packages lying on the Pareto frontier 
are denoted in red. 
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Figure 4. Pareto frontier for ECM packages (from Hendricken et al., 2012) 
 
It now became a task for the survey to determine which of these packages would most 
likely be selected by real market actors.  Thus the characteristics of those packages lying 
on the Pareto curve were used to create the retrofit packages shown to respondents as 
part of the hypothetical building retrofit scenario (shown in Table 2).  In other words, a 
primary goal was to determine at which point along the Pareto curve would the market 
place itself.  In an effort to isolate the financial components of the retrofit decision, the 
decision was made to present each retrofit package as a generic option – meaning only 
the relevant financial information was presented for each option.  The component 
technologies were not specified as this would likely bring other subjective factors to bear 
on the selection process (e.g., building-specific considerations that may alter the effect of 
the financial metrics). 
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Data from pencil and paper surveys were entered into the online form and 
combined with the data previously obtained from the online format.  Statistical tests and 
graphs were done in SPSS and Microsoft Excel 2010. 
 
 
3.  RESULTS 
3.1 Analysis of the Energy Efficiency Indicator survey data 
After filtering the data to look only at commercial office buildings within the 
United States, some important differences in acceptable payback period emerged 
between different types of organization ownership.  Figure 5 shows a graph of longest 
acceptable payback period for investment in energy efficiency as a function of 
organization ownership, revealing a spectrum of acceptable payback periods between 
private-sector, publicly-traded organizations on one end and government-owned 
organizations on the other end.  A chi-square test of independence revealed the 
differences to be statistically significant, χ2 (24, N = 1453) = 267.70, p = .000).  To test the 
hypothesis that differences in allowable payback period between types of ownership is a 
function of how frequently energy usage data is reviewed within an organization, a 
second chi-square test of independence was performed on frequency of energy usage 
data review and organization ownership.  Results were significant, χ2 (32, N = 1472) = 
56.51, p = .005).  Figure 6 shows a comparison of how frequently members of an 
organization review energy usage data by organization ownership.  It is interesting to 
note that while these data generally follow the same trend as longest allowable payback 
period, a key difference is that government-owned organizations reported a frequency 
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of energy usage data review that was very similar to the value reported by private-
sector, privately-held organizations. 
 
Figure 5. Longest allowable payback period by organization ownership (EEI data) (N=1452) 
 
 
Figure 6. Frequency of review of energy usage data by organization ownership (EEI data) 
(N=1452) 
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Together, these results suggest that the ownership of an organization has an important 
effect on the longest allowable payback period for investments in energy efficiency, and 
that these values are not simply due to a lack of review of energy consumption data by 
the organization.  The finding that government-owned organizations are willing to 
accept longer payback periods for investment in energy efficiency despite their relatively 
frequent analysis of energy usage data, along with the finding that private-sector, 
publicly-traded organizations review their energy consumption data comparatively 
frequently and yet still have shorter allowable payback periods, suggest that review of 
energy consumption data is not enough to increase investment in energy efficiency and 
that these organizations may have inherently different planning horizons. 
 
 
3.2 Results of the semi-structured interviews 
3.2.1 Metrics Used to Make Decisions Regarding Building Retrofit Investments 
Simple payback was cited by interview participants as the dominant metric by which 
retrofit investments are considered (Figure 7).  In addition to simple payback, several 
respondents reported using more sophisticated financial metrics such as net present 
value (NPV), internal rate of return (IRR), savings-to-investment ratio (SIR, mentioned 
by one respondent), or a combination of these metrics.  Additionally, approximately 12% 
of respondents factored tax rebates and government incentives into their metric 
calculations; however, this category was most commonly given less weight than other 
categories.  Non-financial performance ratings such as LEED or EnergyStar ratings were 
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cited by approximately 21% of respondents as playing a role in decisions regarding 
retrofits, though in most cases this appears to be a secondary consideration after an 
acceptable payback period has been achieved.  The finding that more advanced financial 
metrics were cited much less frequently than simple payback period supports the notion 
that any retrofit investment must first pass a “simple payback period” test before it is 
given additional consideration.  Coupled with the results from the EEI data, these results 
affirm the importance for an investment to adhere to restrictions on payback period. 
 
Figure 7. Top three metrics used to make decisions about retrofit investments (N=16) 
 
3.2.2 Value of Metrics 
For simple payback, the average payback period acceptable to respondents was 
5.4 years with a standard deviation of 4.86 years (one value was reported at 20 years).  
Assuming a lifespan of 10 years, this would correspond to an annual rate of return of 
approximately 15%.  The mean of 5.4 years is slightly higher than the mean payback 
period for all organizations from the EEI data (the mean range chosen was between 3 
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and 4 years) but is of a similar magnitude.  Because of the small sample size, differences 
in acceptable payback period were not broken down between different organization 
types in the semi-structured interview data, as was done with EEI data. 
 
3.2.3 Factors Affecting Decision to Adopt New or Nonstandard Technologies 
“Payback/Energy service company (ESCO) guarantee,” along with “An example 
of local success” were cited by respondents as the most important factors affecting the 
decision to adopt a new or non-standard technology for a building retrofit (Figure 8).  
However, several respondents noted that they either did not understand or did not fully 
trust performance contract guarantees offered by energy ESCOs. Building simulation 
modeling was ranked by only 8% of respondents as being one of the top three tools 
affecting retrofit decisions.  This may suggest that the complexity of some models allows 
only those with expert knowledge to capitalize on the projections afforded by these 
tools, or that the modeling results are used as a “point of departure” but are not in 
themselves sufficient to sway a major retrofit decision. Coupled with the results of the 
previous question, these data suggest that while computer modeling is an important 
initial step in the retrofit decision-making process, stakeholders place more weight on 
actually seeing the technology in operation and that such operation must be convincing 
from a cost-benefit perspective.  
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Figure 8. Factors affecting the decision to adopt new or non-standard technologies. (N=16) 
 
3.3 Results of the structured surveys 
The results of the structured surveys provided more in-depth information on 
many of the decision factors identified in the semi-structured interviews.  In particular, 
they afforded a chance to further explore the importance of simple payback period as an 
evaluation metric and to test if it is possible to alter this behavior. 
 
3.3.1 Characteristics of the respondent pool 
From experience with the semi-structured interviews, it was believed that 
finding enough building owners to constitute a sufficient survey sample would be 
difficult.  Thus a strategic decision was made to expand the eligibility pool to include 
professionals that regularly work with building owners and can answer questions from 
these owners’ points of view.   This group of advisors was asked to answer the questions 
from the point of view of the last commercial building owner they had worked with.  
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were instantly disqualified.  Figure 9 shows how respondents chose to answer the 
survey questions.  Figure 10 shows the breakdown of respondents by job function. 
 
 
Figure 9. Perspective of survey respondents. 
 
 
Figure 10. Breakdown of respondents' job function. 
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Respondents were also asked about which party (owner vs. tenant) was 
responsible for paying the utility bills in their hypothetical building.  Figure 11 shows 
how respondents chose to answer this question.  Approximately half of the scenarios 
involved building space occupied by the owner and half of the scenarios involved 
building space leased to a tenant.  In roughly one quarter of the scenarios (half of the 
leased cases) the building owner paid utility bills for a tenant using the space. 
 
 
Figure 11. Respondents' assumptions for utility bill-paying responsibilities. 
 
 
Given that the geographic location of a building may be important when making 
decisions about a retrofit, respondents were asked to report the state where their 
building existed.  Figure 12 shows how respondents chose to locate their buildings. 
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Figure 12. States where respondents chose to locate their buildings. 
 
Lastly, respondents were asked to characterize the type of organization that owns the 
building.  This breakdown is shown in Figure 13. 
 
 
Figure 13. Building owner organization classification. 
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3.3.2 Respondents’ perceptions of specific retrofit technologies 
Respondents were asked to rate the attractiveness of 26 individual ECMs for 
their hypothetical building.  As discussed previously, the list of ECMs was designed to 
represent a majority of retrofit technologies currently available on the market, and 
match with energy modeling done by Hendricken et al. (2012).  Each ECM was rated on 
a Likert scale from 1 to 5, with 1 representing “very unattractive” and 5 representing 
“very attractive.”  Respondents were also given the ability to answer “no experience” for 
each ECM.  Such responses did not affect the final results.  The scores for each ECM 
were averaged.  These results are shown in Figure 14.  Generally speaking, respondents 
expressed positive views of less capital-intensive ECMs such as temperature reset 
strategies, weatherization, and occupancy sensors.  ECMs requiring longer payback 
periods, such as green roof upgrades, switching to a heat pump system, and radiant 
heating/cooling, were ranked near the bottom of the list. 
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Figure 14. Respondents' mean perceptions of specific technologies (5=very attractive, 1=very 
unattractive) 
2.92
3.12
3.26
3.28
3.30
3.40
3.52
3.54
3.56
3.63
3.71
3.81
3.86
3.87
3.94
3.96
3.96
3.97
4.07
4.08
4.09
4.13
4.30
4.31
4.36
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
Green roof upgrade
Switching to heat pump system
Radiant Heating/Cooling + Dedicated Outdoor Air
System
Photovoltaic (solar)
Switching to ground-source heat pump system
High efficiency elevator upgrade
Shading
Combined heat and power  system
Central chiller plant upgrade
LED Lighting upgrade
Insulated walls upgrade from R-6 to R-11
White roof upgrade
Plug load control
T-5 Lighting upgrade
High-efficiency cooling upgrade
Variable-air-volume  (VAV) system upgrade*
Central boiler upgrade from 70% to 95%
Insulated roof upgrade from R-15 to R-30
Double pane window upgrade
Daylighting
Smart grid controls / metering
Commissioning
Occupancy sensors
Weatherization
Temperature Reset Strategy
57 
 
 
 
3.3.3 Use of simple payback period as a financial metric 
Simple payback period is defined as the amount of time required to recoup the 
costs of an investment [64].  The calculation is easy to perform and easy to understand, 
however, there are three problems with using SPP as an investment metric: (1) it does 
not consider the time value of money, (2) it does not account for savings which occur 
after the initial expenses have been recouped, and (3) it does not take into account 
marginal returns on competing investment options.  On the other hand, incremental rate 
of return may serve as a “comparison” metric when competing investments are being 
considered, and is able to distinguish between investments that SPP could not.  For 
instance, consider two competing investment options, Option A and Option B, which 
have equal first costs but Option A has a SPP of 1 year and Option B has a SPP of 2 
years.  In the case the incremental rate of return for the investment with the longer 
payback period is negative and there is no benefit to pursuing this option.  In this 
situation, the two metrics (SPP and incremental IRR) would agree on Option A.  But 
consider the case where Option A has a first cost and cost savings that are both 
significantly lower than for Option B.  Here, the incremental rate of return for Option B 
would be both positive and significant, indicating that investment in Option B is 
desirable.  Hence the incremental rate of return takes into account the benefits offered by 
alternative investment options with shorter SPPs, as well as the amount of additional 
capital required for the investment with a longer SPP.  The incremental rate of return 
can be thought of as the rate of return on all monies spent above and beyond the next 
cheapest option. 
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Again, the investment options presented in the survey were based on the work of 
Hendricken et al. (2012), in which different retrofit packages of specific ECMs were 
developed and their associated costs estimated.  There is some degree of uncertainty in 
projections of energy savings (and their associated rates of return); thus, the values for 
SPP and incremental rate of return were presented as fairly wide ranges to reflect 
realistic market conditions. Though based on the specific results of Hendricken et al. 
(2012), these values may applied in other scenarios provided that: (1) five or six options 
can be developed with payback periods spaced over the range from roughly 2-20 years, 
and (2) the capital investment for each incrementally longer payback period is 
substantially (1.5 to 3 times) larger than the next lowest payback period option. 
To assess the effect that providing additional financial information (i.e., 
incremental rate of return) has on the retrofit investment decision, respondents were 
first asked to select a retrofit package based solely on its estimated simple payback 
period (they were given only the information in the “Simple Payback Period” column in 
Table 2).  For this survey question, choices were given as ranges in order to incorporate 
an element of uncertainty in the projections and thus to make the options more realistic.  
Table 2 shows the packages presented to respondents, each shown with its associated 
simple payback period and incremental rate of return. 
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Table 2. Information presented to respondents regarding retrofit package selection 
Retrofit Package Simple Payback Period Incremental Rate of Return for 
Package 
Option 1 No upgrades (baseline)  
Option 2 2.3 – 3.9 years 25% to 43% (relative to Option 1) 
Option 3 3.1 – 5.2 years 13% to 23% (relative to Option 2) 
Option 4 4.6 – 7.8 years 7% to 15% (relative to Option 3) 
Option 5 5.4 – 9.1 years 3% to 10% (relative to Option 4) 
Option 6 7.7 – 13.0 years -3% to 2% (relative to Option 5) 
Option 7 11.5 – 19.5 years -9% to -13% (relative to Option 6) 
 
In order to compare these findings with the payback periods in the EEI data, the 
distributions of acceptable payback period were converted to cumulative distributions 
by using the midpoint from the ranges of values given and plotted on a single graph 
(Figure 15). Although the comparison is only an approximate one since two surveys did 
not use the same bins, it appears that there is general agreement between them. 
 As the second part of this question, respondents were given the incremental rates 
of return for each option (shown in column 3 of Table 2) and asked again to select the 
package most likely to be adopted.  The distributions of responses to both parts of this 
question are shown in Figure 16.  
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Figure 15. Comparison of cumulative % (midpoint) payback periods between EEI data and Drexel 
data. 
 
 
Figure 16. Respondents' selection of retrofit packages based on simple payback period alone and 
when combined with incremental rate of return 
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The response distributions show that while Option 4 (4.6 - 7.8 years) was the most 
commonly-selected option when only information on simple payback period was given, 
the addition of the data on incremental rate of return caused the distribution to shift 
toward the options with faster payback periods.  The net result was a movement toward 
Options 2 and 3, which had break-even times of 2.3 – 3.9 years and 3.1 – 5.2 years, 
respectively.  Figure 17 shows that overall, respondents made a significant change in 
their EER package selection when given the additional data on incremental rate of 
return, tending to choose an option with a slightly faster payback period.  It is notable 
that the addition of data on incremental rate of return caused a net movement towards 
packages with shorter payback periods, particularly that over a quarter of respondents 
selected Options 1 or 2, indicating a required incremental rate of return of greater than 
25%.  It is possible that some respondents did not understand how to properly interpret 
this metric; it is also possible that better understanding of the incremental gain in 
financial returns shifted respondents away from longer payback periods.  Matching the 
results from this question to the Pareto curve (Figure 4), it is evident that the preferences 
of decision-makers would make it difficult to achieve an energy use intensity of less than 
9 kWh/ft2 * year. 
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Figure 17. Mean preferred retrofit package based on additional information given. 
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Table 3. Acceptable payback period by group. 
GROUPING MEAN PREFERRED PACKAGE 
BASED ONLY ON PAYBACK PERIOD 
MEAN PREFERRED PACKAGE 
BASED ON PAYBACK PERIOD & 
INCREMENTAL IRR 
SPP (yrs) Incr. IRR SPP (yrs) Incr. IRR 
  mean std. dev. mean std. dev. mean std. dev. mean std. 
dev. 
                  
All respondents 5.62 2.23 14.65 9.96 4.89 1.98 18.69 10.67 
                  
Answer from own 
perspective 
5.60 2.51 13.72 9.95 4.88 2.43 17.72 10.63 
Answer from 
client’s perspective 
5.67 2.09 15.09 9.98 4.90 1.72 19.16 10.70 
         
Private sector 5.54 2.16 15.02 10.02 4.89 2.03 18.71 10.69 
Public sector 5.86 2.44 13.46 9.76 4.91 1.84 18.6 10.72 
                  
Publicly-traded 5.64 2.14 15.99 11.1 4.82 1.86 20.28 11.34 
Not publicly-
traded 
5.56 2.51 14.21 9.56 4.91 2.03 18.17 10.43 
                  
In HUB region 5.68 2.21 14.84 10.11 4.78 1.73 19.31 10.47 
Not in HUB region 5.47 2.3 14.16 9.65 5.14 2.48 17.16 11.11 
                  
Owner pays bills 5.71 2.36 14.2 10.06 4.86 1.99 18.47 10.45 
Tenant pays bills 5.35 1.8 15.91 9.64 4.96 1.99 19.31 11.37 
                  
Democrats 5.5 2.18 14.46 9.76 4.91 2.27 18.81 11.23 
Republicans 5.79 2.23 14.14 9.78 5.23 1.93 17.26 10.65 
Independents 5.38 1.84 15.8 9.7 4.49 1.41 20.64 9.93 
                  
 
When asked which metric most affected their decision, approximately 60% of 
respondents reported basing their decision primarily on payback period even when 
presented with additional information on incremental rate of return.  Figure 18 shows 
which additional metrics (if any) respondents would have liked to see presented.  
Approximately 35% of respondents said they would have liked to been given a benefit-
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cost ratio of each option, and 33% of respondents claimed they would have liked to see 
the first cost value.  Only 17% of respondents wished they had been given the net 
present value (NPV), and 11% indicated they required no additional metrics.  Overall, 
these results provide additional evidence that decision-makers continue to make 
suboptimal decisions when evaluating energy-efficient investment by placing too much 
weight on first cost and not enough weight on more appropriate metrics, such as NPV.  
These findings are significant because they suggest that any retrofit investments must 
fall within a range of acceptable payback periods before receiving much consideration 
from decision-makers.  They also suggest that metrics such as incremental rate of return 
may have little effect in convincing decision-makers to increase their acceptable payback 
periods.  It should be noted that neither “energy savings” nor “energy savings costs” 
was prompted as part of this question, thus it is impossible to say to what degree the 
presentation of this information would have an effect on respondents’ choices. 
 
Figure 18. Additional metrics respondents would have liked to see for hypothetical retrofit 
package selection. 
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 In retrospect, it is possible that some portion of the respondents did not 
understand the information being presented to them in the latter half of this question.  
Incremental rate of return is a comparatively sophisticated financial metrics; thus, it 
would not be surprising if some respondents misinterpreted the information.  It is 
recommended that future survey work on this issue include a question to make sure the 
information is being properly interpreted by respondents.  This could be accomplished 
with something as simple as “Have you ever encountered this concept before?  Do you 
feel comfortable utilizing this information to make decisions?”  An alternative approach 
would be to include an example with actual numerical data to show how the 
information should be used. 
3.3.4 Respondents’ perceptions of the future cost of energy 
Respondents believe that the cost of goods and services (as measured by the 
Consumer Price Index) and the cost of energy will both increase slightly over the next 20 
years.  However, respondents expect that the increase in the cost of energy will not keep 
pace with the overall increase in the cost of goods and services (see Table 4), implying 
that the cost of energy (in real terms) will decrease over the next 20 years.  Such 
perceptions are very important when considering why owners are not keen on investing 
in energy-efficiency projects with 20 years payback periods.  However, it must be noted 
that there was significant variation in respondents’ perceptions of the future cost of 
energy (the standard deviations are shown in parentheses below).  This variability 
indicates a lack of consensus as to what future energy costs will be. 
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Table 4. Respondents’ beliefs in the future cost of energy compared to inflation. 
Index Mean annual 
change in nominal 
cost 
Mean annual 
change in real 
cost 
Energy 
Information 
Agency 
prediction [65] 
Cost of goods/services – 5 years +4.2% (9.4%) --  
Cost of goods/services – 20 
years 
+8.4% (15.9%) --  
Cost of energy – 5 years +3.5% (9.3%) -0.7%  
Cost of energy – 20 years +6.8% (16.1%) -1.6% ~+1.1%*  
 
*Note: EIA forecast is average real increase in all types of energy for the commercial sector 
through 2035. 
 
3.3.5 Do “split incentives” have a measurable effect on retrofit investment decisions? 
 
To test the hypothesis that split incentives (as defined by which party is 
responsible for paying the utility bills) have a measurable effect on which retrofit 
package is likely to be selected, a series of one-way ANOVA tests were run on preferred 
retrofit package by utility-paying party.  To accomplish this, the tenancy structure 
variable was collapsed to create a binary variable indicating whether or not the building 
owner pays the utility bills.  Group differences were not significant when the test was 
run on the entire sample or when the sample was filtered to contain only private-sector 
organizations.  However, when the sample was restricted to privately-owned, publicly-
traded organizations, the results were significant (F (1, 47) = 4.760, p = .03, see Figure 19).  
This lines up closely with the finding from the EEI data that among any type of 
organization ownership, private-sector, publicly traded organizations have the lowest 
acceptable payback period for retrofit investments (Figure 5). 
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Figure 19. Preferred retrofit package characteristics for tenants-pay-bills vs. owner-pays-bills (for 
privately-owned, publicly-traded organizations only). 
 
Probing this relationship a bit further, assumptions regarding the type of bill-paying 
scenario among different types of organization ownership type were examined.  Figure 
20 shows that responses for buildings owned by private-sector, publicly-traded 
organizations had the lowest number of instances in which the building owner is 
responsible for paying the utility bills, while non-profits had the highest.  When the 
“ownership shared between government and private sector” was removed, a one-way 
ANOVA reveals these differences are statistically significant, F (3, 202) = 3.02, p = 0.031. 
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Figure 20. Differences in assumptions for bill-paying scenario by owner organization type 
 
 
Pursuing further this line of inquiry, a multivariate regression was run on simple 
payback period using the binary dummy variables “publicly-traded” (1 if publicly-
traded, 0 otherwise) and “split incentives” (1 if the building pays the tenant’s utility 
bills, 0 otherwise) as predictors.  By themselves, neither “publicly-traded” nor “split 
incentives” had a significant effect on SPP.  However, the interaction of both variables 
was significant (p=.03), as shown in Figure 21. 
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Figure 21. The interactive effect of trading status and split incentives on payback period 
 
 
Lastly, when the data were filtered to include only those scenarios in which the “split 
incentives” was not a factor, Figure 22 shows there was virtually no difference in 
acceptable payback periods between owner organization type.  So while other factors 
cannot be ruled out as underlying reasons for differences in acceptable payback period 
between owner organization types, it is clear that “split incentives” represents a 
significant barrier to energy efficiency, and is most keenly felt by private-sector, 
publicly-traded companies. 
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Figure 22. Mean SPP by owner organization type for scenarios in which split incentives do not 
exist 
 
3.3.6 Conjoint Question Results 
Originally developed in mathematical psychology, conjoint methods provide a 
way to determine which attributes of a multi-attribute package are perceived by 
consumers as the most important.  By forcing respondents to make tradeoffs between 
different attributes of a generic retrofit package, we were able to derive relative weights 
in the decision process of the following four dimensions: 
• Break-even time for the investment in the EER (based only on projected energy 
cost savings) 
• Change in employee productivity as a result of the EER 
• Change in pollutant emissions of the building due to reduced energy 
consumption 
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• The presence/absence of a performance contract guarantee (which does not affect 
first cost) 
The conjoint structure yielded a set of “part-worth” utility scores for each attribute.  
Such scores are calculated based on the ranking of a defined set of combinations of 
attribute values, and may serve as regression coefficients for each attribute level in a 
linear equation.  The part-worth utilities are additive, meaning they may be added 
together to obtain the total utility for a specific combination of attribute levels.  Higher 
utility values indicate a greater preference for a given attribute level, with less negative 
values considered greater than more negative values [66].  The part-worth utilities are 
shown in Table 5.  As expected, shorter break-even times were preferred to longer 
break-even times.  Similarly, a greater increase in employee productivity was preferred 
to both the static productivity level (0% change) and a slight decrease in productivity (-
2%).  Surprisingly, respondents seemed to have greater preference for lesser reductions 
in pollutant emissions, as well as little regard for the presence of a performance contract 
guarantee, as evidenced by higher utility scores for presumably less desirable values of 
these factors. 
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Table 5. Part-worth utility scores for each level of all factors. 
FACTOR LEVEL PART-
WORTH 
UTILITY 
Break-even time for retrofit investment 3.0 years -.534 
  6.0 years -1.069 
  10.0 years -1.603 
Change in employee productivity +10% -.279 
  0% (no change) -.558 
  -2% -.838 
Change in pollutant emissions -50% .062 
  -25% .124 
  -5% .186 
Presence of performance contract guarantee Yes .049 
  No .098 
(constant)   6.438 
 
 
Additionally, the conjoint questions yielded relative weights for each of the four main 
attributes (categories).  Because respondents were given no additional information 
besides the attribute levels shown above, comparisons can only be made between these 
dimensions relative to one another.  The relative weights for each of them are shown in 
Figure 23.  As expected, “break-even time for the retrofit investment” was weighted 
most heavily at 59%, followed by “change in employee productivity” at 31%.  “Change 
in pollutant emissions” and “presence of a performance contract guarantee” carried 
much less weight in the retrofit decision (7% and 3%, respectively). However, 
performance guarantees may be important in specific contexts, such as novel 
technologies, that were not explicitly considered here. 
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Figure 23. Relative importance scores for conjoint factors. 
 
4.  DISCUSSION 
By cross-referencing the results of three separate data sources on energy-efficient 
retrofit investment in commercial buildings, this chapter has attempted to better 
characterize several important factors in the retrofit investment process.  These include 
the continued use of simple metrics (such as simple payback period) in place of more 
accurate financial metrics (such as NPV or incremental rate of return), and the precise 
nature that “split incentives” has on an owner’s investment decisions.  These results, 
along with some recommendations to help market mechanisms operate successfully, are 
detailed below. 
• Decision-makers believe that the overall cost of energy over the next 20 years 
will not keep pace with inflation.  This is important because it may explain why 
31%
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3%
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building owners are not eager to make investments in energy efficiency that 
extend beyond several years.  Additionally, there was a significant degree of 
variability in respondents’ perceptions of the future cost of energy.  As noted in 
Chapter I, such beliefs may have the effect of convincing decision-makers to 
simply wait to invest in any sort of retrofits. 
• Investment choices made solely on the basis of simple payback period are not set 
in stone and can be changed by presenting the decision-maker with additional 
financial information.  When presented only with information on the break-even 
time of a retrofit investment, a majority of respondents chose the option 
corresponding to a simple payback period of 4.6-7.8 years.  However, when 
presented with additional information on the incremental rate of return for these 
same options, there was a net movement away from retrofit options with greater 
payback periods and toward options with payback periods of 3.1-5.2 years and 
less.  While a shift to packages with shorter payback periods may not be 
desirable from an energy-efficiency standpoint, it does show that while decision-
makers’ investment choices are guided by payback period, these choices are not 
written in stone.  These results also lend credence to the idea that some decision-
makers are not making investment choices on sound financial principles, but 
instead using “rules of thumb” as a decision heuristic.  The net change was a 
substantial shift away from Option #5 and toward Option #2, with more than a 
quarter of respondents indicating a preference for hurdle rates exceeding 25%, a 
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rate much greater than typical borrowing costs.  These findings suggest that a 
greater degree of general financial literacy may be important in encouraging 
greater adoption of energy efficiency measures.  Failing this, it is again 
recommended that financial data for local examples of success are made 
available for public view. 
• “Split incentives,” the responsibility for paying the utility bills, does have a 
measurable effect on retrofit investment decisions for private-sector, publicly-
traded organizations.  The effect may also be felt in other areas, but not to the 
same degree.  The cause of this disproportionate effect may be due to a higher 
percentage of cases in this sector in which the building owner does not pay the 
utility bills; however, other reasons cannot be ruled out (such as more stringent 
internal investment criteria, e.g., “higher hurdle rates”).  It does appear that 
frequency of review of energy consumption data by an organization is not the 
primary reason why some types of organization are willing to accept longer 
payback periods than others.  Taken as a whole, these results reinforce the need 
to realign “split incentives” so that market mechanisms may operate 
successfully.  This also suggests that correcting such mechanisms will have its 
greatest impact among publicly-traded organizations.  While “green leases” may 
be able to correct some of the problems associated with “split incentives,” the 
importance of disclosure of financial information from local retrofit projects 
cannot be overlooked.  Some larger cities have already begun to adopt 
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mandatory energy consumption disclosure laws, and these are likely to have a 
strong impact on the commercial building retrofit market in the US. 
• Purely financial concerns still outweigh more indirect measures of asset worth, 
though many building owners recognize the importance of employee 
productivity.  The results of the conjoint portion of the structured survey reveal 
that decision-makers continue to place a significant amount of weight on 
payback period while at the same time recognizing that employee productivity 
has an important effect on a building’s bottom line.  It is not surprising that 
decision-makers placed comparatively less emphasis on environmental aspects 
since these are typically not tied to financial return.   Although little emphasis 
was also placed on performance guarantee considerations, it cannot be ruled out 
that these may exert great influence over some retrofit investment decisions. 
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CHAPTER III : TOWARD A MORE ENERGY-EFFICIENT COMMERCIAL 
BUILDING MARKET 
 
This final chapter presents a broader discussion of barriers to increased energy 
efficiency in the building retrofit market and possible ways in which they may be 
surmounted. 
1.  SYNTHESIS 
The first chapter of this thesis presented an overview of potential barriers to 
increased investment in energy efficiency.  Some of these barriers can be classified as 
“market failures” (such as imperfect information and split incentives) while others (such 
as the use of high discount rates by decision-makers) may considered to be reactions to 
underlying problems but are not in themselves market failures.  A significant degree of 
heterogeneity in the market further obfuscates the decision processes commonly 
pursued during retrofit projects and makes it difficult to ascertain the relative 
importance of decision factors. 
The second chapter detailed the results of analyses on three data sources in an 
effort to better characterize the barriers that were discussed in Chapter I.  A measurable 
effect of a recognized market failure (i.e., “split incentives”) on retrofit decision-making 
was documented and a possible source of market failure (the tendency of decision-
makers to base decisions on simple payback period rather than more theoretically 
justified metrics) was observed.  In their text on policy analysis, Weimer and Vining 
(2011) explain that when there is evidence of market failure in an operational market 
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and an absence of government intervention, the correct path is to assess possible 
interventions and compare their costs to the cost of the market failure.  Together, these 
results suggest that increased energy (and economic) efficiency in the retrofit market 
could be achieved via a government intervention to realign investment incentives and 
provide information to relevant stakeholders.  In such an instance, one would expect a 
net increase in demand for energy efficient technologies and overall gain in social 
surplus.  Specific mechanisms to achieve these goals are discussed in Section 2 below. 
Recognizing that the term “energy efficiency gap” is not a well-defined economic 
concept (see Chapter I for details), it may be possible to generate a very rough measure 
of the difference between our current level of energy efficiency and some ideal level.  To 
do this, we simply compare the hurdle rate for investment in energy efficiency reported 
by survey respondents to an accepted value of the social discount rate.  The reported 
acceptable hurdle rate reported by respondents based only on simple payback period 
was 14.65%.  If we use 5% as the social discount rate [67], then it becomes evident that a 
discrepancy of 9.65% exists between the two values.  Looking at it from a different angle, 
the acceptable hurdle rate reported by survey respondents is nearly 3 times the social 
discount rate.  By matching these rates to ECM packages along the Pareto curve shown 
in Figure 5, it should be possible to derive an approximate value for the difference in 
energy consumption between the highest level of efficiency that is technically feasible 
and the level of energy efficiency that would be adopted by the market.  A hurdle rate of 
14.65% falls somewhere between package #3 and package #4, suggesting an energy use 
intensity of approximately 12 kWh/ft2*year.  A rate of 5% falls somewhere between 
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package #5 and package #6, which corresponds to an energy use intensity of 
approximately 9.5 kWh/ft2*year.  The difference between the two is 2.5 kWh/ft2*year, 
which is roughly 12% of the stock average energy use intensity of 21 kWh/ft2*year.  This 
measure represents one possible approach to measuring the “gap.” 
2.  DATA USE CONSIDERATIONS 
Several important caveats must be considered when interpreting these results or 
using them for further research: 
• The results of the semi-structured interviews and online surveys are mainly 
applicable to mid-sized commercial office buildings.  While they may in some 
instances also be applicable to other building types, care should be taken when 
applying values from this study to other building types. 
• Even among mid-sized office buildings, there is significant variability in 
massing, construction, subsystems, and end uses.  So care must be taken even 
when generalizing these findings to mid-size commercial office buildings.  While 
the survey was developed to minimize variation due to building characteristics, 
it is very likely that the influence of other factors enters into the decision 
equation when other building types are considered. 
• Results may vary across different regions, particularly for the ratings of specific 
ECMs. This survey was not designed to identify regional differences but such 
differences may exist. 
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3.  POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
As mentioned previously in this paper, improvement in energy efficiency is a 
moving target – and it seems there is no “silver bullet” solution short of allowing the 
price of energy to properly internalize all applicable environmental and health 
externalities associated with its use and production and then letting the market react 
accordingly.  The next best thing to “self internalization,” from a theoretical standpoint, 
would be the introduction of a carbon tax or similar policy [14].  Such taxes have been 
implemented with some degree of success in other countries, including Ireland and 
Sweden [68], [69].  However, the introduction of a carbon tax is a complicated political 
and engineering problem and would likely take years to implement.  If cities such as 
Philadelphia hope to reduce their building energy use 20% by the year 2020 (a goal put 
forth by the EEB HUB), a more expedient set of solutions should be adopted.  In this 
chapter I argue in favor of three specific policy solutions that should be able to address 
all of the aforementioned barriers and should be able to be implemented with relative 
ease. 
3.1 Recommendation #1: Incentivize non-profit and government organizations to act as 
“early adopters” 
Recognizing that non-profit and government organizations tend to accept longer 
payback periods than their private sector counterparts, it may be possible to convince 
these organizations to invest in newer retrofit technologies that have the potential to 
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reduce energy consumption but do not have the track record to justify the expense to 
more risk-averse investors.  Certain non-profit and government institutions are also in a 
unique position to reap the rewards of such investment since they do not experience the 
same problems of “split incentives” to the same extent as felt by publicly-traded firms in 
the private sector.  If new technologies are adopted and perform well, this information 
could be documented in a third-party database (discussed in Recommendation #2 
below) with the idea that private-sector organizations would then adopt them.  The 
provision of empirical data would serve to reduce uncertainty associated with the 
operation of the retrofit technologies and the knowledge that it can be done locally 
would mitigate problems created by bounded rationality (for instance, by letting 
potential investors view the retrofitted building).  On the other hand, if certain ECMs are 
adopted and perform poorly, this would send a strong signal to the market indicating 
those technologies should be avoided.  Several efforts of this nature are already 
underway in the Philadelphia area, including demonstration projects by EEB Hub at the 
Navy Yard and work at the Friends’ Center in Center City. 
3.2 Recommendation #2: Third-party database showcasing local examples of success 
The second recommendation is the creation of a third-party database containing 
information on retrofits that have been performed in a given region and including 
building energy consumption, which specific subsystems are in use, the installation and 
operating costs of these subsystems, and the building’s overall utility bills over time.  
This solution goes a step beyond the standard “mandatory disclosure” solution in that it 
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would include data on the prevalence and performance of specific building subsystems, 
thus acting as an inventory of local examples of success (or failure).  By making this 
database both public and searchable, the performance of specific technologies could be 
easily evaluated by decision-makers by looking at their performance in buildings of a 
similar size.  The Department of Energy has begun implementing a very similar 
database called the Buildings Performance Database [70], though the level of detail that 
will be included remains to be seen.  In creating a database of this nature, it would be 
critical to maintain transparency in the presentation of energy data while at the same 
time respecting personal and proprietary information of the building owners.  This is 
closely related to the problem of “credibility and trust” discussed in Chapter I – if this 
trust is ever betrayed, the efficacy of the database will likely decrease.  An analog of 
such a database does exist in other markets – for instance, the service provided by 
Consumer Reports to potential car-buyers can have an important effect on the market 
via the provision of standardized information to consumers. 
3.3 Recommendation #3: Widespread promotion of on-bill financing 
The third recommendation is the promotion of on-bill financing for energy-
efficient retrofits.  On-bill financing is an idea initially put forth by the Energy Efficiency 
Institute as a way to promote energy efficiency in the rental housing market and has 
now been adopted by utility companies in at least 23 states around the country [71].  
Although much variability exists between utility companies on-bill finance offerings, a 
typical setup will allow the building owner to obtain a loan directly from their utility 
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company or a third-party lender in order to install certain energy-efficient retrofit 
measures in a building.  Responsibility for repaying the loan is tied to the building that 
received the upgrade rather than the building owner, thus removing an element of risk 
for the building owner.  The loan is eventually repaid as part of the utility bill through 
energy cost savings resulting from the upgrade [72].  Given the findings reported in 
Chapter II on the effect of “split incentives” on retrofit investment, it is clear that this 
barrier remains one of the most important hurdles to achieving greater energy efficiency 
in the commercial office building market.  In a scenario in which a tenant pays the utility 
bills but does not own the building, the other recommendations (given above) will 
streamline the process for increased investment in energy efficiency, but not provide the 
initial incentive to do so.  The ability of a building owner to profit from investments in 
tenant-leased spaces, along with the reduction of risk that goes along with pinning the 
investment to the building itself, are important difficulties that would be simultaneously 
addressed by on-bill financing. 
3.4 Addressing existing barriers 
Table 6 presents a matrix of existing barriers and how each potential barrier is 
addressed or not addressed by these two mechanisms.  It can be argued that the few 
barriers which are not directly addressed can be categorized as “secondary” barriers in 
that they are merely more specific forms of “primary” barriers.  Specifically, the barriers 
described as values, inertia, power, and culture may be seen as outgrowths of imperfect 
information manifested in different ways within an organization [5].  As values are 
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informed by information, it follows that values can be altered by providing (more or 
better) information.  If the problem of asymmetric information could be properly 
addressed, then in this view these secondary barriers would also be addressed. 
4.  THIS THESIS’ CONTRIBUTION 
This thesis has presented the most pertinent findings from two sets of surveys aimed at 
characterizing the commercial building energy retrofit process and found them to be 
generally in agreement with a third data source, the Johnson Controls Energy Efficiency 
2011 Indicator survey.  The relative importance of various financial metrics (such as 
simple payback period) in stakeholders’ decision processes was quantified and the 
ability to alter the outcomes of these processes via the addition of new financial 
information was documented.  It was found that stakeholders’ behavior may be partially 
explained by their beliefs in the future cost of energy, which they expect will decrease in 
real terms over the next 20 years (though significant variation does exist in these 
perceptions).  An approximate quantitative measure of “split incentives” was obtained 
and differences in its effect between different organization ownership structures were 
outlined.  Specific policy solutions to increase investment in energy efficiency – targeting 
non-profit and government organizations to act as “early adopters,” the creation of a 
third-party database with cost and performance information for ECMs, and the 
widespread adoption of on-bill financing – were recommended. 
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Table 6. Existing barriers to energy efficiency and recommended solutions 
Theoretical Barrier Addressed by targeted 
adoption of ECMs 
Addressed by third-party 
database with cost data 
Addressed by on-bill 
financing 
Imperfect information  4  
Adverse selection  4  
Principal-agent 
relationships 
 4 6 
Split incentives   4 
Hidden costs  4  
Access to capital   4 
Risk / Uncertainty 4 6 6 
Heterogeneity  6  
Form of information  6  
Credibility and trust  6  
Bounded rationality 6 6  
Values *  secondary  
Inertia *  secondary  
Power *  secondary  
Culture *  secondary  
KEY 4 = addressed  6 = partially addressed  
* This is a secondary barrier and is addressed via “Imperfect information.” 
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APPENDIX 1: COMBINATIONS OF ECMS USED IN ENERGY MODELING 
 
 
 
# Component ECMs 
1 Uncommissioned Baseline 1: 25% Window Area 
6 Uncommissioned Baseline 1 + Lighting Improvement 
7 Uncommissioned Baseline 1 + HE Elevators + LED Lighting 
8 Uncommissioned Baseline 1 + DP Windows 
9 Baseline 1 (Commissioned) 
10 Baseline 1 + Temp Reset Strategy 
11 Baseline 1 + Lighting Improvement + Temp Reset Strategy 
12 Baseline 1 + HE Elevators + LED Lighting + Temp Reset Strategy 
13 Baseline 1 + DP Windows + Temp Reset Strategy 
14 Baseline 1 + HE Boiler + Temp Reset Strategy 
15 Baseline 1 + HE Cooling + Temp Reset Strategy 
16 Baseline 1 + HE Cooling + HE Boiler + Temp Reset Strategy 
17 Baseline 1 + HE Elevators + Lighting Improvement + DP Windows + Temp Reset Strategy 
18 Baseline 1 + HE Elevators + LED Lighting + DP Windows + Temp Reset Strategy 
19 Baseline 1 + Lighting Improvement + HE Cooling + HE Boiler + Temp Reset Strategy 
20 Baseline 1 + HE Elevators + LED Lighting + HE Cooling + HE Boiler + Temp Reset Strategy 
21 Baseline 1 + DP Windows + HE Cooling + HE Boiler + Temp Reset Strategy 
22 Baseline 1 + HE Elevators + Lighting Improvement + DP Windows + HE Cooling + HE Boiler + Temp Reset Strategy 
23 Baseline 1 + HE Elevators + LED Lighting + DP Windows + HE Cooling + HE Boiler + Temp Reset Strategy 
24 Baseline 1 + VAV upgrade no DCV + HE Cooling + HE Boiler 
25 Baseline 1 + VAV upgrade + HE Cooling + HE Boiler 
26 Baseline 1 + VAV upgrade + HE Cooling + HE Boiler + Lighting Improvement 
27 Baseline 1 + VAV upgrade + HE Cooling + HE Boiler + HE Elevators + LED Lighting 
28 Baseline 1 + VAV upgrade + HE Cooling + HE Boiler + DP Windows 
29 Baseline 1 + VAV upgrade + HE Cooling + HE Boiler + HE Elevators + Lighting Improvement + DP Windows 
30 Baseline 1 + VAV upgrade + HE Cooling + HE Boiler + HE Elevators + LED Lighting + DP Windows 
31 Baseline 1 + Heat Pump + VAV upgrade 
32 Baseline 1 + Heat Pump + VAV upgrade + Lighting Improvement 
33 Baseline 1 + Heat Pump + VAV upgrade + HE Elevators + LED Lighting 
34 Baseline 1 + Heat Pump + VAV upgrade + DP Windows 
35 Baseline 1 + Heat Pump + VAV upgrade + HE Elevators + Lighting Improvement + DP Windows 
36 Baseline 1 + Heat Pump + VAV upgrade + HE Elevators + LED Lighting + DP Windows 
37 Baseline 1 + Central chiller + HE Boiler + VAV upgrade 
38 Baseline 1 + Central chiller + HE Boiler + VAV upgrade + Lighting Improvement 
39 Baseline 1 + Central chiller + HE Boiler + VAV upgrade + HE Elevators + LED Lighting 
40 Baseline 1 + Central chiller + HE Boiler + VAV upgrade + DP Windows 
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41 Baseline 1 + Central chiller + HE Boiler + VAV upgrade + HE Elevators + Lighting Improvement + DP Windows 
42 Baseline 1 + Central chiller + HE Boiler + VAV upgrade + HE Elevators + LED Lighting + DP Windows 
43 Baseline 1 + White Roof  + Temp Reset Strategy 
44 Baseline 1 + Insulated Roof + Temp Reset Strategy 
45 Baseline 1 + White Roof + VAV upgrade + HE Cooling + HE Boiler + HE Elevators + Lighting Improvement + DP Windows 
46 Baseline 1 + White Roof + Heat Pump + VAV upgrade + HE Elevators + Lighting Improvement + DP Windows 
47 Baseline 1 + White Roof + Heat Pump + VAV upgrade + HE Elevators + LED Lighting + DP Windows 
48 Baseline 1 + White Roof + Central chiller + HE Boiler + VAV upgrade + HE Elevators + Lighting Improvement + DP Windows 
49 Baseline 1 + White Roof + Central chiller + HE Boiler + VAV upgrade + HE Elevators + LED Lighting + DP Windows 
50 Baseline 1 + Walls + VAV upgrade + HE Cooling + HE Boiler + HE Elevators + Lighting Improvement + DP Windows 
51 Baseline 1 + Walls + Insulated Roof + Heat Pump + VAV upgrade + HE Elevators + Lighting Improvement + DP Windows 
52 Baseline 1 + Walls + Insulated Roof + Heat Pump + VAV upgrade + HE Elevators + LED Lighting + DP Windows 
53 Baseline 1 + Walls + Insulated Roof + Central chiller + HE Boiler + VAV upgrade + HE Elevators + Lighting Improvement + DP Windows 
54 Baseline 1 + Walls + Insulated Roof + Central chiller + HE Boiler + VAV upgrade + HE Elevators + LED Lighting + DP Windows 
55 Baseline 1 + White Roof + GSHP COP 6 + VAV upgrade + Lighting Improvement 
56 Baseline 1 + White Roof + GSHP COP 6 + VAV upgrade + HE Elevators + Lighting Improvement + DP Windows 
57 Baseline 1 + White Roof + GSHP COP 6 + VAV upgrade + HE Elevators + LED Lighting + DP Windows 
58 Baseline 1 + White Roof + GSHP COP 6 + VAV upgrade + HE Elevators + LED Lighting + DP Windows + Walls 
59 Baseline 1 + Insulated Roof + GSHP COP 6 + VAV upgrade + HE Elevators + LED Lighting + DP Windows + Walls 
60 Baseline 1 + Ice Tank + White Roof + Central chiller + HE Boiler + VAV upgrade + HE Elevators + Lighting Improvement + DP Windows 
61 Baseline 1 + Ice Tank + White Roof + Central chiller + HE Boiler + VAV upgrade + HE Elevators + LED Lighting + DP Windows 
62 Baseline 1 + Chilled Beams & DOAS + White Roof + Central chiller + HE Boiler + HE Elevators + Lighting Improvement + DP Windows 
63 Baseline 1 + Chilled Beams & DOAS + White Roof + Heat Pump + HE Elevators + Lighting Improvement + DP Windows 
64 Baseline 1 + Chilled Beams & DOAS + Walls + Insulated Roof + Central chiller + HE Boiler + HE Elevators + LED Lighting + DP Windows 
65 Baseline 1 + Chilled Beams & DOAS + White Roof + GSHP COP 6 + HE Elevators + Lighting Improvement + DP Windows 
66 Baseline 1 + Chilled Beams & DOAS + Walls + Insulated Roof + GSHP COP 6 + HE Elevators + LED Lighting + DP Windows 
67 Baseline 1 + Chilled Beams & DOAS  + Ice Tank + Walls + Insulated Roof + GSHP COP 6 + HE Elevators + LED Lighting + DP Windows 
68 Baseline 1 + Smart Grid + VAV upgrade + HE Cooling + HE Boiler + Lighting Improvement 
69 Baseline 1 + Smart Grid + VAV upgrade + HE Cooling + HE Boiler + HE Elevators + LED Lighting + DP Windows 
70 Baseline 1 + Smart Grid + Heat Pump + VAV upgrade + HE Elevators + Lighting Improvement + DP Windows 
71 Baseline 1 + Smart Grid + White Roof + Central chiller + HE Boiler + VAV upgrade + HE Elevators + LED Lighting + DP Windows 
72 Baseline 1 + Smart Grid + Walls + Insulated Roof + Heat Pump + VAV upgrade + HE Elevators + LED Lighting + DP Windows 
73 Baseline 1 + Smart Grid + White Roof + GSHP COP 6 + VAV upgrade + HE Elevators + LED Lighting + DP Windows 
74 Baseline 1 + Smart Grid + Walls + Insulated Roof + GSHP COP 6 + VAV upgrade + HE Elevators + LED Lighting + DP Windows 
75 Baseline 1 + Smart Grid + Ice Tank + White Roof + Central chiller + HE Boiler + VAV upgrade + HE Elevators + Lighting Improvement + DP 
Windows 
76 Baseline 1 + Smart Grid + Chilled Beams & DOAS + White Roof + Central chiller + HE Boiler + HE Elevators + Lighting Improvement + DP 
Windows 
77 Baseline 1 + Smart Grid + Chilled Beams & DOAS + White Roof + Heat Pump + HE Elevators + Lighting Improvement + DP Windows 
78 Baseline 1 + Smart Grid + Chilled Beams & DOAS + Walls + Insulated Roof + Central chiller + HE Boiler + HE Elevators + LED Lighting + DP 
Windows 
79 Baseline 1 + Smart Grid + Chilled Beams & DOAS + White Roof + GSHP COP 6 + HE Elevators + Lighting Improvement + DP Windows 
80 Baseline 1 + Smart Grid + Chilled Beams & DOAS + Walls + Insulated Roof + GSHP COP 6 + HE Elevators + LED Lighting + DP Windows 
81 Baseline 1 + Smart Grid + Chilled Beams & DOAS  + Ice Tank + Walls + Insulated Roof + GSHP COP 6 + HE Elevators + LED Lighting + DP 
Windows 
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82 Baseline 1 + CCHP + Smart Grid + White Roof + Abs Chiller + VAV upgrade + HE Elevators + Lighting Improvement + DP Windows 
83 Baseline 1 + CCHP + Smart Grid + Walls + Insulated Roof + Abs Chiller + VAV upgrade + HE Elevators + Lighting Improvement + DP 
Windows 
84 Baseline 1 + CCHP + Smart Grid + White Roof + Abs Chiller + VAV upgrade + HE Elevators + LED Lighting + DP Windows 
85 Baseline 1 + CCHP + Smart Grid + White Roof + Abs Chiller + VAV upgrade + HE Elevators + Lighting Improvement + DP Windows 
86 Baseline 1 + CCHP + Smart Grid + Ice Tank + White Roof + Abs Chiller + VAV upgrade + HE Elevators + Lighting Improvement + DP 
Windows 
87 Baseline 1 + CCHP + Smart Grid + Chilled Beams & DOAS + White Roof + Abs Chiller + HE Elevators + Lighting Improvement + DP Windows 
88 Baseline 1 + CHP + Smart Grid + White Roof + HE Cooling + VAV upgrade + HE Elevators + Lighting Improvement + DP Windows 
89 Baseline 1 + CCHP + Smart Grid + Chilled Beams & DOAS + Walls + Insulated Roof + Abs Chiller + HE Elevators + Lighting Improvement + 
DP Windows 
90 Baseline 1 + CHP + Smart Grid + White Roof + Abs Chiller + VAV upgrade + HE Elevators + LED Lighting + DP Windows 
91 Baseline 1 + CHP + Smart Grid + White Roof + Central chiller + VAV upgrade + HE Elevators + Lighting Improvement + DP Windows 
92 Baseline 1 + CHP + Smart Grid + Walls + Insulated Roof + Central chiller + VAV upgrade + HE Elevators + Lighting Improvement + DP 
Windows 
93 Baseline 1 + PV + Smart Grid + White Roof + Central chiller + HE Boiler + VAV upgrade + HE Elevators + Lighting Improvement + DP 
Windows 
94 Baseline 1 + PV + Smart Grid + Walls + Insulated Roof + Central chiller + HE Boiler + VAV upgrade + HE Elevators + Lighting Improvement + 
DP Windows 
95 Baseline 1 + PV + Smart Grid + White Roof + Central chiller + HE Boiler + VAV upgrade + HE Elevators + LED Lighting + DP Windows 
96 Baseline 1 + PV + Smart Grid + White Roof + Central chiller + HE Boiler + VAV upgrade + HE Elevators + Lighting Improvement + DP 
Windows 
97 Baseline 1 + PV + Smart Grid + Ice Tank + White Roof + Central chiller + HE Boiler + VAV upgrade + HE Elevators + Lighting Improvement + 
DP Windows 
98 Baseline 1 + PV + Smart Grid + Chilled Beams & DOAS + White Roof + Central chiller + HE Boiler + HE Elevators + Lighting Improvement + 
DP Windows 
99 Baseline 1 + PV + Smart Grid + Chilled Beams & DOAS + Walls + Insulated Roof + Central chiller + HE Boiler + HE Elevators + Lighting 
Improvement + DP Windows 
10
0 
Baseline 1 + PV + Smart Grid + White Roof + GSHP COP 6 + VAV upgrade + HE Elevators + Lighting Improvement + DP Windows 
10
1 
Baseline 1 + PV + Smart Grid + Chilled Beams & DOAS + White Roof + GSHP COP 6 + HE Elevators + Lighting Improvement + DP Windows 
10
2 
Baseline 1 + PV + Smart Grid + Chilled Beams & DOAS + Walls + Insulated Roof + GSHP COP 6 + HE Elevators + Lighting Improvement + DP 
Windows 
10
3 
Baseline 1 + PV + Smart Grid + Chilled Beams & DOAS + Walls + Insulated Roof + GSHP COP 6 + HE Elevators + LED Lighting + DP Windows 
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APPENDIX 2: SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW INSTRUMENT 
 
 
 
 
Semi-Structured Interview for Decision Makers 
Greater Philadelphia Innovation Cluster (GPIC) Task 4: Policy, Markets, and Behavior 
 
We would like to talk to you about decision making for retrofits for small commercial 
buildings. We are particularly interested in buildings that are less than 100,000 square 
feet. 
 
1. What triggers the decision to retrofit a small commercial building? 
 
Prompts 
 
Owner/Tenant Needs 
Architectural Considerations 
o Programming (spatial adjustments to better support primary activities) 
o Aesthetics 
o Draw in more customers 
o Other 
 Structural/material improvements 
Occupant Variables 
o Improved Comfort 
 Thermal only or are there other variables of concern for 
comfort? 
o Improved Productivity 
o Improved Health/Well-Being 
Energy Efficiency 
o What generally prompts the desire to be energy efficient? 
 Longer term financial goals (i.e. energy savings, payback) 
 Improved company image (“green” conscious, innovative, etc.) 
 Tax breaks/local, state, and federal incentives? 
 High energy costs? 
 Personal sense of environmental responsibility? 
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 Increased asset value of property? 
Facility Maintenance 
o Mandatory upgrade to prevent failure? 
Code Requirements 
o Which entity’s requirements?  Federal government?  State 
government? 
  
 
 
2. Currently, what potential barriers must be considered as a part of this 
decision? 
 
Prompts 
 
Initial costs and/or projected maintenance costs? 
Capital available / allocated for work? 
Loss of operating revenue? 
o Displacement of workers 
o Suspension of services (if large retrofit) 
Legal barriers (i.e. zoning requirements, building codes, etc.)? 
Lack of knowledge about/familiarity with retrofit process? 
Design challenges? 
o Building size & complexity 
o Communication between client and architect 
o Keeping design decisions under budget 
o Community feedback 
Uncertainty about outcomes? 
Timing of retrofit process? 
  
 
3. Once the building retrofit process is underway, what specific efficiency 
measures are targeted? 
 
Prompts 
 
Building Energy Sources 
o Solar 
 PV 
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 Solar Hot Water 
o Ground source heat pump 
o Combined Heat & Power 
o Wind 
Building Orientation & Massing 
Building Envelope 
o Glazing  
o Envelope material and detailing 
 Insulation type 
o Shading  
o Shape & porosity  
Building Environmental Conditioning Systems 
o Active HVAC systems 
 Choice of system type 
 Equipment efficiency 
o Passive systems 
 Solar gains/thermal mass 
 Natural ventilation 
 Occupant considerations (i.e. improved perceived control) 
Building Lighting, Appliances, Plug Loads 
o Lighting 
 LED vs. lower efficiency lighting 
o Other major appliance improvements? 
Interior design  
o Colors/textures 
o Furniture/office accessories 
o Spatial layout (esp. in open plan offices) 
Energy demand/pricing 
o Demand-response 
o Determining how tenants will be charged 
 
Do you see certain of these retrofit opportunities being pursued more heavily in 
current commercial projects than others?  If so, why? 
 
 
4. Who is most responsible for making each of these key design decisions? 
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Prompts 
 
Owner 
Architect 
Engineer 
General Contractor 
Tenant 
Code/Zoning 
Energy Services Company 
 
 
5. What factors go into the decision to adopt a new or non-standard 
technology for a building retrofit? (please specify what technology this 
would be) 
 
Prompts 
 
Do there need to be local examples of success? 
o Willing to invest in an unproven, higher risk technology if the benefits are 
potentially greater than for alternative, safer options? 
Vendor recommendation? 
Does technical literature matter? 
Energy models or cost calculators? 
o Anticipated payback/Net Present Value? 
What about vendor or Energy Service company performance guarantees? 
Are the “image” implications of adopting novel technologies over more 
traditional ones considered? 
 
 
6. How is the performance of these new technologies estimated? (prior to 
installation) 
 
Prompts 
 
Vendor claims/guarantees 
Engineer/architect experience 
General contractor estimates 
Owner experience 
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Technical literature information/Previous case studies (describe source) 
Computer models (describe model and who runs it) 
Anecdotal information 
 
 
7. What metrics are used in decision making about energy efficiency 
upgrades? 
 
Prompts 
 
First Cost 
Net Present Value 
Payback period (simple or discounted) 
Benefit cost ratio 
Internal rate of return/return on invested capital 
Increased asset value / rent  
 
Non-financial metrics, such as LEED rating, IEQ, increased productivity. 
 
 
8. What values of these metrics must be achieved? Over what time period at 
what interest rate? 
 
 
9. What are the primary sources of uncertainty to consider when making 
decisions about a retrofit building design? 
 
Prompts 
 
Operational uncertainties 
o Projected monthly/annual energy savings 
o System/equipment maintenance and life span 
o Occupant variables 
 Uncertainty in comfort/productivity/health outcomes? 
Cost-benefit analysis uncertainties 
o Length of estimated payback period (can it be guaranteed?)  
o Interest rate  
o Energy costs 
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o Costs to society (included or not?) 
o Regulatory risk / policy uncertainties regarding long-term availability of 
government incentives 
Structural uncertainties? 
o Right financial/energy model choices? 
Value uncertainties? 
o What bounds do you put on the analysis? (i.e., are externalities considered, 
etc.) 
 Other assumptions? 
 
 
10. How are these uncertainties normally considered in the decision making 
process?  
 
Prompts 
 
 Bounded sensitivity analysis (explore a range of different assumptions or input 
values?) 
Monte Carlo (repeated simulation of outcome based on uncertainties in 
parameters?) 
Are there ways to establish particular values/ranges of inputs for use in these 
analyses?   
o Examples of values/distributions you might typically use for these 
analyses? 
 Example: Energy costs (what source is used to project into future?) 
 
 
11. Do decision makers view energy efficiency as a way to protect against 
energy cost volatility and/or other uncertainties that can adversely affect 
the expense and effectiveness of building operation?  
 
Prompts 
 
Why or why not? 
Is so, how is this factor incorporated in decision making? 
Formally with risk-metrics or informally? 
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APPENDIX 3: STRUCTURED SURVEY INSTRUMENT 
BUILDING RETROFIT SURVEY 
Drexel University, in conjunction with the Energy Efficient Buildings (EEB) HUB, is conducting 
research on how people make decisions related to energy efficiency in building retrofits. 
To qualify for this survey, you must have some experience with building energy retrofits in a 
commercial or institutional (i.e., non-residential) setting within the United States.   
The entire survey takes about 20 minutes to complete.   
If you have any questions about this survey, please email mah364@drexel.edu. 
 
*** THIS SURVEY MAY ALSO BE COMPLETED ONLINE AT http://tinyurl.com/drexel-retrofit-
survey *** 
 
Completed paper copies may be mailed to: 
M. Hamilton 
Drexel University CAEE 
3141 Chestnut Street 
251 Curtis 
Philadelphia, PA 19104 
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Q1 Are you a Drexel University student or employee? 
No.   Please proceed with survey.  
Yes.  You must provide your Drexel ID number in order to receive a gift card. What is your 
Drexel ID? ____________________ 
Q2   Sector or Industry  (Check the one that best describes your sector or industry.) 
 - Academic Researcher (1) 
 - Consulting Architect (2) 
 - Building Owner (3) 
 - Contractor who provides retrofit installation, construction or building commissioning, services (4) 
 - Manufacturer, Distributor or Manufacturer’s Representative (5) 
 - Energy Service Company (6) 
 - Consulting Engineer (7) 
 - Financial Institution (8) 
 - Government, regulator, or policy maker (9) 
 - Labor Organization (10) 
 - Non-profit professional, trade, energy, development, or environmental organization (11) 
 - Professional or Technical Association (12) 
 - Property Management (13) 
 - Real Estate Sales (14) 
 - Researcher or Technology Developer (not affiliated with an academic institution) (15) 
 - Urban Planning Consulting (16) 
 - Utility Company (17) 
 - Facilities Management (18) 
 -Other (19) ____________________ 
Q3 Are you LEED accredited?       
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
 
Q4 How many years  you have you worked in any field related to building energy efficiency,  
including design, operation, maintenance, management, construction/installation,  auditing, 
investment decision making, etc. ? 
Years of experience: ______ 
Q5 Average % of work time spent on energy-efficient retrofits: ______ % work time  
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Q6   If you are a commercial/institutional building owner or work for a commercial/institutional 
building owner, please answer the following questions from your own perspective or your 
organization's perspective.        
If you are not a commercial/institutional building owner but work with 
commercial/institutional building owners, consider a commercial/institutional building owner 
similar to the U.S. commercial/institutional building owner that you most recently worked with 
and answer the questions from their point of view.         
 I am a U.S. commercial/institutional building owner or work for a U.S. commercial/institutional 
building owner and will answer the questions from my own/my organization's perspective.  
 I work with U.S. commercial/institutional building owners and will answer the questions from the 
perspective of the last U.S. commercial/institutional building owner I worked with.  
 I cannot answer these questions from a U.S. commercial/institutional building owner's perspective.  
 
 
Q7   Retrofit Package Selection for a Hypothetical Office Building        
Please consider a hypothetical 3-story, 60,000 square foot masonry commercial/institutional 
office building with 25% glazing (i.e., window area). It was last refurbished about 20 years ago. 
It has single pane windows, and three roof-top, constant-air-volume units (RTUs) with electric 
cooling (COP 3) and hydronic heating (by a central boiler with 70% efficiency). The envelope 
meets ASHRAE 90.1-1989 code requirements. Interior lighting is a mixture of incandescent 
lighting and T-8 fluorescent lighting. The building undergoes periodic commissioning. 
Accordingly the HVAC system is well balanced and otherwise well maintained.        
Assume the subsystems in this building need to be replaced as they are nearing the end of their 
useful life.  Assume that for the baseline, you replace all energy-related subsystems with the 
most inexpensive up-to-date counterparts.  Other options allow you to selectively make 
upgrades to some of these subsystems.         
 
Q9 You must assume that this building is either occupied by the owner, or that it is leased by 
the owner to a tenant or tenants.  Which will you assume? 
 I will assume that the building owner occupies the building.  
 I will assume that the building owner leases out space in the building to other tenants but that the 
building owner pays the utility bills.  
 I will assume that the building owner leases out the space in the building to other tenants and that 
those tenants pay their own utility bills.  
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Q9B You must assume this building is located in a specific state and city:         
In what state is the hypothetical building you are considering located? (for example, "FL" or 
"Florida"): 
State:_______________ 
In what city or metropolitan area is the hypothetical building you are considering located in? 
City/metro area:__________________ 
 
Q9C Which category best describes the organization that owns this building? 
 Private sector, publicly traded for-profit  
 Private sector, privately held for-profit  
 Government-owned  
 Ownership shared between government and private sector  
 Non-profit institution  
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Q10A   For the building previously described, please rate each of the following retrofit 
technologies in terms of potential attractiveness for inclusion in an energy-efficient retrofit on a 
scale from 1 to 5 where 1=very unattractive (should not be included in a retrofit for any of a 
variety of reasons, such as, will not produce energy savings that justify initial cost, will not be 
reliable, will cause problems for occupants, etc.) and 5=very attractive (should be included in 
retrofit, will produce energy savings justifying initial cost, will be reliable, will provide benefits 
to occupant productivity or comfort, etc.). 
 
  No experience 
1. Very 
unattractive 
2. Unattractive 3. Neutral 4. Attractive 
5. Very 
attractive 
T-5 Lighting upgrade ( replace T-
8 lighting with T-5 lighting) (1) 
                  
LED Lighting upgrade (replace T-
8 lighting with light emitting 
diode lighting) (2) 
                  
Shading (screens or overhangs 
to reduce solar gain during 
summer) (3) 
                  
Double pane window upgrade 
(replacing single-pane glazing 
with double-pane glazing which 
has an air-gap) (4) 
                  
White roof upgrade (applying a 
white, reflective coating to the 
existing roof) (5) 
                  
Green roof upgrade (applying a 
fairly-adiabatic vegetative 
structure to the existing roof) (6) 
                  
Insulated roof upgrade from R-
15 to R-30 (7) 
                  
Insulated walls upgrade from R-
6 to R-11 (8) 
                  
Weatherization (reducing 
envelope leakage through 
sealing cracks, etc.) (9) 
                  
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Q10B   For the building previously described, please rate each of the following retrofit 
technologies in terms of potential attractiveness for inclusion in an energy-efficient retrofit on a 
scale from 1 to 5 where 1=very unattractive (should not be included in a retrofit for any of a 
variety of reasons, such as, will not produce energy savings that justify initial cost, will not be 
reliable, will cause problems for occupants, etc.) and 5=very attractive (should be included in 
retrofit, will produce energy savings justifying initial cost, will be reliable, will provide benefits 
to occupant productivity or comfort, etc.). 
 
  
No 
experience 
1. Very 
unattractive 
2. Unattractive 3. Neutral 
4. 
Attractive 
5. Very 
attractive 
Variable-air-volume (VAV) system 
upgrade plus associated control 
system (including replacing existing 
CAV boxes to be VAV boxes, 
equipping the supply fans with VFDs, 
and upgrading the control systems 
accordingly)  
                  
Radiant Heating/Cooling and 
Dedicated Outdoor Air System 
(completely replacing the HVAC and 
duct systems with a system 
employing radiant heating and 
cooling subsystems and a duct 
system designed for transporting 
ventilation air only.) 
                  
Switching to heat pump system 
(heating and cooling is replaced with 
air-to-air heat pumps with a COP of 4 
in cooling mode) 
                  
Switching to ground-source heat 
pump system (replacing existing 
heating and cooling systems with 
geothermal heat pumps with a 
cooling COP of 6 and electrical 
auxiliary heating system) 
                  
High-efficiency cooling upgrade 
(upgrading current RTUs to have a 
COP of 5) 
                  
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Q10C   For the building previously described, please rate each of the following retrofit 
technologies in terms of potential attractiveness for inclusion in an energy-efficient retrofit on a 
scale from 1 to 5 where 1=very unattractive (should not be included in a retrofit for any of a 
variety of reasons, such as, will not produce energy savings that justify initial cost, will not be 
reliable, will cause problems for occupants, etc.) and 5=very attractive (should be included in 
retrofit, will produce energy savings justifying initial cost, will be reliable, will provide benefits 
to occupant productivity or comfort, etc.). 
 
  No experience 
1. Very 
unattractive 
2. Unattractive 3. Neutral 4. Attractive 
5. Very 
attractive 
Central boiler upgrade from 
70% to 95% 
                  
Central chiller plant upgrade 
(replacing existing RTU systems 
with chiller + AHU systems with 
a central chiller having a COP of 
5) 
                  
Combined heat and power 
(CHP) system (combined heat 
and power system which is sized 
so that heat generated can meet 
peak heating demand) 
                  
Commissioning (a one-time 
process of examining the whole 
building systems including 
recalibrating sensors and 
balancing air systems) 
                  
Smart grid controls / metering 
(assumes that the building level 
demand energy will be reduced 
by 15% through measures such 
as dimming lights during times 
of peak demand) 
                  
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Q10D   For the building previously described, please rate each of the following retrofit 
technologies in terms of potential attractiveness for inclusion in an energy-efficient retrofit on a 
scale from 1 to 5 where 1=very unattractive (should not be included in a retrofit for any of a 
variety of reasons, such as, will not produce energy savings that justify initial cost, will not be 
reliable, will cause problems for occupants, etc.) and 5=very attractive (should be included in 
retrofit, will produce energy savings justifying initial cost, will be reliable, will provide benefits 
to occupant productivity or comfort, etc.). 
 
  No experience 
1. Very 
unattractive 
2. Unattractive 3. Neutral 4. Attractive 
5. Very 
attractive 
Temperature Reset Strategy 
(thermostat is programmed to 
minimize heating and cooling during 
unoccupied times and is adjusted 
higher in summer and lower in 
winter) (1) 
                  
Daylighting (add a lighting control 
system to dim perimeter lighting 
when outdoor lighting is sufficient) 
(2) 
                  
Plug load control (more efficient 
equipment, better management of 
equipment, etc.) (3) 
                  
Occupancy sensors (implementing 
occupancy sensors for use in lighting 
management and thermostat 
control) (4) 
                  
High efficiency elevator upgrade 
(using new variable speed drives 
that consume 50% less power) 
                  
Photovoltaic (solar) installation 
(assumes system covers 50% of the 
roof area by fixed (non-tracking) 
panels) 
                  
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Q11 Based on the information on Break-even Time in the matrix below, please choose the 
retrofit package you think would be most likely to be selected for an energy-efficient retrofit of 
the hypothetical building previously described.   Choose one option only. 
 
  
Break-even time for investment in energy-efficient upgrades 
(range reflects uncertainty in projections) 
Option 1 (baseline) N/A (no upgrades) 
Option 2 2.3 - 3.9 yrs 
Option 3 3.1 - 5.2 yrs 
Option 4 4.6 - 7.8 yrs 
Option 5 5.4 - 9.1 yrs 
Option 6 7.7 - 13.0 yrs 
Option 7 11.5 - 19.5 yrs 
 
 Option 1 (baseline -- no upgrades) 
 Option 2  
 Option 3  
 Option 4  
 Option 5  
 Option 6  
 Option 7  
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Q12 Given the additional information on Incremental Return on Investment in the matrix 
below, please choose the retrofit package you think would be most likely to be selected for an 
energy-efficient retrofit of the hypothetical building previously described.   All other 
information is the same.  Choose one option only. 
 
  
Break-even time for investment in energy-efficient 
upgrades (range reflects uncertainty in projections) 
Incremental rate of return 
(on additional money relative 
to previous option) 
Option 1 (baseline) N/A (no upgrades) N/A (no upgrades) 
Option 2 2.3 - 3.9 yrs 
25% to 43% (relative to 
Option 1) 
Option 3 3.1 - 5.2 yrs 
13% to 23% (relative to 
Option 2) 
Option 4 4.6 - 7.8 yrs 
7% to 15% (relative to Option 
3) 
Option 5 5.4 - 9.1 yrs 
3% to 10% (relative to Option 
4) 
Option 6 7.7 - 13.0 yrs 
-3% to 2% (relative to Option 
5) 
Option 7 11.5 - 19.5 yrs 
-9% to -13% (relative to 
Option 6) 
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Q13 Of the metrics given in the previous question, which metric most influenced your upgrade 
package decision? 
 Break-even time for investment in energy-efficient upgrades  
 Incremental rate of return on investment  
 
Q14 Please select the additional financial metric, if any, you would most like to see for the 
previous upgrade package selection decision. 
 No additional metrics  
 First cost  
 Net present value (NPV)  
 Benefit cost ratio  
 Other (please specify) ____________________ 
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Q15   Please rank-order the following retrofit packages from 1 to 9 (1=most desirable, 9=least 
desirable) in terms of which would most merit consideration and evaluation for the 
hypothetical building previously described. 
Use each number only once! 
 
Your 
ranking 
Break-even time 
for investment in 
energy-efficient 
upgrades 
(based only on 
projected energy 
cost savings) 
Change in Employee 
Productivity 
(increased proficiency, less 
absenteeism) 
Change in Pollutant 
Emissions due to 
energy consumption  
(airborne, waterborne, 
fine dust) (negative 
sign implies a 
reduction) 
Performance 
Contract 
Guarantee     
(does not 
affect first 
cost) 
 
 10.0 years 0% (no change) -5% Yes 
 10.0 years -2% -50% No 
 6.0 years +10% -5% No 
 6.0 years -2% -25% Yes 
 6.0 years 0% (no change) -50% Yes 
 3.0 years -2% -5% Yes 
 3.0 years +10% -50% Yes 
 10.0 years +10% -25% Yes 
 3.0 years 0% (no change) -25% No 
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Q16   How do you expect the overall cost of goods and services (for example, the cost of living 
as estimated by the Consumer Price Index) to change in the future?                     
Over the next 5 years, I expect the overall cost of goods and services (as represented by the 
Consumer Price Index) to increase/decrease (circle one) by ____% per year on average.  
Over the next 20 years, I expect the overall cost of goods and services (as represented by the 
Consumer Price Index) to increase/decrease (circle one) by ____% per year on average.  
 
Q17   How do you expect the cost of energy (natural gas, oil, electricity, etc.) to change in the 
future? 
Over the next 5 years, I expect the overall cost of energy (natural gas, oil, electricity, etc.) to 
increase/decrease (circle one) by ____% per year on average.  
Over the next 20 years, I expect the overall cost energy (natural gas, oil, electricity, etc.) to 
increase/decrease (circle one) by ____% per year on average.  
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Please answer the following questions from your own point of view.  The information in these 
questions does not relate to any information given previously in this survey. 
Q18   For the following questions, people consider two buildings, Building A and Building 
B.  They are identical, except that Building B is more energy efficient than Building A.    For two 
otherwise identical units in Buildings A and B, what do you think is the most tenants would be 
willing to pay in additional monthly rent for a unit in Building B if their monthly energy costs 
in Building B would be $100 lower than for an otherwise identical unit in Building A?   
 $0 more a month (1) 
 $25 more a month (2) 
 $50 more a month (3) 
 $75 more a month (4) 
 $100 more a month (5) 
 $125 more a month (6) 
 $150 more a month (7) 
 $175 more a month (8) 
 $200 more a month (9) 
 
 
Q19 If the energy efficiency of Building B was advertised as good for American energy 
independence and the reduction of dependence on foreign oil, what do you think is the most 
tenants would be willing to pay in additional monthly rent for a unit in Building B if their 
monthly energy costs in Building B would be $100 lower than for an otherwise identical unit in 
Building A? 
 $0 more a month (1) 
 $25 more a month (2) 
 $50 more a month (3) 
 $75 more a month (4) 
 $100 more a month (5) 
 $125 more a month (6) 
 $150 more a month (7) 
 $175 more a month (8) 
 $200 more a month (9) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
115 
 
 
 
Q20 If the energy efficiency of Building B was advertised as good for the environment and the 
reduction of carbon emissions, what do you think is the most tenants would be willing to pay 
in additional monthly rent for a unit in Building B if their monthly energy costs in Building B 
would be $100 lower than for an otherwise identical unit in Building A? 
 $0 more a month (1) 
 $25 more a month (2) 
 $50 more a month (3) 
 $75 more a month (4) 
 $100 more a month (5) 
 $125 more a month (6) 
 $150 more a month (7) 
 $175 more a month (8) 
 $200 more a month (9) 
 
 
Q21 If the energy efficiency of Building B was advertised as good for lowering the cost of 
energy use and the reduction of tenant’s energy bills, what do you think is the most tenants 
would be willing to pay in additional monthly rent for a unit in Building B if their monthly 
energy costs in Building B would be $100 lower than for an otherwise identical unit in Building 
A? 
 $0 more a month (1) 
 $25 more a month (2) 
 $50 more a month (3) 
 $75 more a month (4) 
 $100 more a month (5) 
 $125 more a month (6) 
 $150 more a month (7) 
 $175 more a month (8) 
 $200 more a month (9) 
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Q22 In general, politically I consider myself: 
 Very Liberal (1) 
 Liberal (2) 
 Somewhat Liberal (3) 
 Moderate (4) 
 Somewhat Conservative (5) 
 Conservative (6) 
 Very Conservative (7) 
 
Q23 On economic issues, politically I consider myself: 
 Very Liberal (1) 
 Liberal (2) 
 Somewhat Liberal (3) 
 Moderate (4) 
 Somewhat Conservative (5) 
 Conservative (6) 
 Very Conservative (7) 
 
Q24 On social issues, politically I consider myself: 
 Very Liberal (1) 
 Liberal (2) 
 Somewhat Liberal (3) 
 Moderate (4) 
 Somewhat Conservative (5) 
 Conservative (6) 
 Very Conservative (7) 
 
Q25 Politically, which group do you most identify with: 
 The Democratic Party (1) 
 The Republican Party (2) 
 Independents (3) 
 Other; Please Specify: (4) ____________________ 
 
 
Q26 Please select which gift card type you would like. 
 Target (1) 
 Amazon (2) 
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 Starbucks (3) 
 
Q27 Please provide your mailing address to have the gift card mailed to you.  Your address will 
not be linked to your survey responses and will not be shared or made public, per IRB 
regulations. 
Recipient name:_______________________________________ 
Street address:________________________________________ 
Unit number, suite number:______________________________ 
City:_________________________________________________ 
State/Province:________________________________________ 
Zip code:_____________________________________________ 
Email address:_________________________________________ 
 
Q28 Thank you for participating in our survey.  We appreciate any comments you may have: 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________
  
 
 
 
